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Most companies listed on the S&P 500 index have reported smoothed earnings since the 1990s 
inspiring questions from regulators about the accuracy of financial statements. In 1998, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued SFAS No. 133 (Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities) to establish accounting and reporting standards for 
derivative instruments. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was issued to eradicate earnings 
management activities and improve transparency in financial reporting. Although many studies 
have been conducted to evaluate changes in reporting requirements, much less is known about the 
effectiveness of these regulations on earning smoothing with discretionary accruals (DA) and 
derivative hedge reporting (DHR). Accordingly, this study was an investigation of the 
effectiveness of SOX and SFAS No. 133 on DA, and DHR. The research questions were used to 
examine DA, and to evaluate the transparency of DHR for the years 1997 through 2007. This 
study is a quasi-experimental research design where 30 companies from the high technology 
industry segment were randomly drawn to form 330 observations. The modified Jones model was 
used to separate DA and repeated measures analyses of variance were used to assess differences 
in levels before and after the issuance of SOX. A Quality Disclosure Index (QDI) was used to 
assess the transparency of DHR and repeated measures of variance were used to evaluate the QDI 
scores before and after the issuance of SFAS No. 133. The findings suggest DA activities are 
decreasing but represent over 50% of total net accruals for all years and the QDI for DHR is 
decreasing. Improved financial regulation is needed. The study contributes to positive social 
change by providing regulators and investors with new information about accruals for income 
conservative firms by segmenting DA and investigating the level of transparency in DHR that 
could be used to formulate appropriate financial regulation and improve the quality of our 
financial reporting system.
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Within the finance discipline, the analysis of earnings management through the use of 
discretionary accruals is in the early stages of development. Axioms and standards for a model to 
evaluate the degree of discretionary activities have not yet been established. Several divergent 
attempts have been made to explore management choices through the use of accounting accruals 
and the results of these peer-reviewed studies have been mixed. To date, the high technology 
industry segment within the U.S. has not been isolated from other industry sectors in the 
evaluation of discretionary accruals. Firms in the technology industry segment differ from other 
industry segments in that they engage in income conservative practices more frequently and are 
exposed to higher levels of risk to shareholder litigation (Lobo, Zhou, 2006). In addition, high 
tech industry companies are also affected to a greater degree by conservative accounting 
standards on research and development costs (Uday, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004). This study fills 
the knowledge gap of earnings management evaluation through the use of discretionary accruals 
within the income conservative high technology industry segment. 
Watts (2003) defined income conservatism as a higher verification standard applied to 
favorable information resulting in lower cumulative earnings and net asset. The presence of 
income conservatism is illustrated in significantly higher proportions of losses and lower average 
profitability levels for technology firms relative to non-technology firms (Kwon, Yin, & Han, 
2006). These differences mainly surface from differences in operating cash flow levels 
attributable to research and development (R&D) expenses. The financial reporting of technology 
firms also confirms the evidence of an increase in negative non-operating accruals (Uday, et. al., 
2004).  
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Earnings smoothing  as defined by the act of minimizing earnings volatility is achieved 
through the accounting treatment of transactions and or through the use of derivative contracts 
forged to create a hedged financial position in situations where a significant amount of risk exists 
(Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002). Managers utilize derivatives and accounting accruals to 
minimize cash flow volatility, often referred to as earnings smoothing. In 1998, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a mandate (SFAS No. 133 Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities), restricting firms from simultaneously recording 
all offsetting gains and losses on items being hedged. Many critics (e.g., Bowen, Rajopal, & 
Venkatchalam, 2004; Carter, Lynch, & Zechman, 2006; Cohen, Dev, & Lys, 2004; Liu, 2004) 
assert SFAS No. 133 stimulates earnings volatility. However, in 2004 Stammerjohan conducted a 
study of Fortune 500 firms to determine if derivative use either minimized in the face of the new 
FASB mandate or whether cash flow volatility increased after of this new regulation. From his 
study results, Stammerjohan (2004) concluded that although earnings volatility did increase 
shortly after the release of the SFAS No. 133, this increase may be systemic of other factors 
outside of the scope of the issuance of SFAS No. 133. 
Earnings smoothing is a strategy used to deliberately manipulate the company's earnings 
so that the figures match pre-determined targets (Glaum, Lichtblau, & Lindemann, 2004). This 
practice is carried out for income smoothing; thus, rather than having years of exceptionally good 
or bad earnings, companies will attempt to keep the figures relatively stable by adding and 
removing cash from reserve accounts (Beattie, Brown, Manson, 1994). Although managers use 
divergent methods to smooth earnings and these models can be complex, in-depth and 
convoluted, the fundamental objective of these strategies is to meet pre-specified targets (Tucker, 
& Zarowin, 2006).  
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are a set of widely accepted rules, 
standards, and procedures for reporting financial information as established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. Under GAAP, firms are authorized to exercise discretion in 
financial reporting in order to communicate managers’ information about performance (Zeff, 
2005). This implies that managers can choose whether and how they will disclose information in 
their financial reports.  
A  major concern of regulators and investors is that the accounting standards for financial 
derivatives are still in the early stage, which cannot address all aspects of the multifaceted 
financial derivatives market (International Monetary Fund Country report No 05/216). SFAS No. 
133 (Accounting for Financial Derivatives and Hedging Activities) requires all financial 
derivatives be reported at their fair value. The changes in fair value are either recognized as 
earnings or deferred to future periods to offset the changes in the value of items being hedged. 
The SFAS No. 133 standards provide discretions for earnings management (Singh, 2004). The 
determination of the fair value of most derivative instruments are subject to many assumptions 
such as those related to credit and liquidity risk resulting from the exclusion of derivative trading 
from the trading market (Kawaller, 2004). Most derivative instruments are simply contracts 
between a derivative dealer and the user firm, such as interest rate swaps (Leander, 1997).   
Because derivative contracts are not actively traded in the market,their value has no 
market reference (Dubofsky, & Miller, 2003). With no market reference, the value of the 
derivative becomes variable and is largely based on the assumptions used in the analysis of the 
fair market value (Naor, 2006) such as assumptions in the determination of  the fair value of 
derivatives and credit risk. The deferred derivative gains or losses to be reclassified into current 
earnings are also subject to firms’ discretion, because the gains or losses of the items hedged do 
not need to be reported separately under SFAS No. 133 (Kawaller, 2004). 
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Empirical research on earnings management and the valuation of earnings is heavily 
researched in accounting journals; however, the approach to evaluate earnings management 
through the use of discretionary accruals is still in the development phase. In 1996 (and revised in 
1998), Dechow, Jowell Sabino, and Richard Sloan developed a model of non-discretionary 
accruals that builds on related models in Jones (1991), Dechow (1994) and Dechow, Kothari and 
Watts (1996). In 2003, Da Silva Rosa, Sheung, and Walter conducted a study to evaluate whether 
bidding firms that offer shares as consideration engage in earnings management prior to takeover 
announcements (Da Silva Rosa, Sheung, & Walter, 2000). The findings of their study show no 
evidence of managing earnings upward.  
Accruals are defined as the difference between cash flow from operations and net income 
(Anderson, Caldwell, & Needles, 1994). A fundamental property of accruals is that they reverse 
over time. The self-reversing property of accruals reduces the effecctiveness of any planned or 
unplanned earnings management strategies when viewed in the aggregate over a long period of 
time (Anderson, et.al., 1994). The characteristics of the reversing properties of accounting 
accruals suggests that managers who utilize accruals through manipulation cannot rely on 
accruals alone to report strong earnings and when the build-up accrual items invariably start to 
unwind over time, they suppress future earnings and stock prices (Skinner, & Sloan, 2002). 
Manipulation of accruals comes in many forms, from estimating earnings based on a 
rolling average of a previous period such as a quarter to booking several prior months of accruals 
in one period to reflect the number of months outstanding (Collins, & Hribar, 2000). Either 
approach introduces uncertainty and skews the financial history of earnings for a firm, even if 
reversals of these entries follow (Das, & Shroff, 2002). As a result, over time, managers may be 
forced to make up earnings shortfalls with real cash earnings (Beattie, et al., 1994). Much of the 
research focused on earnings management has investigated earnings management decisions 
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during particular events such takeover announcements (Da Silva Rosa, et.al., 2000), a shift in tax 
laws (Mills and Newberry, 2001), or debt covenants (Dechow, 1996). Some managers may use 
these extraneous occurances as justification for an increase in accruals (Mills et. al., 2001). 
Accruals are used daily and are part of the operational expense structures of any firm that utilizes 
accrual based accounting (Anderson, et.al., 1994); due to the use of accounting accruals in firms 
who do now function under a cash basis, it is imperative that the use of accruals during standard 
or regular periods of operation is investigated.  
Previous literature based on eanrings management is based on the assumption that 
accounting accruals and derivatives are used as tools in financial smoothing and earnings 
management (Barton, 2001; Barton, & Simko, 2002; Bruns, & Merchant, 1990; Carter, Lynch, & 
Zechman, 2006). However, Nissim and Penman (2003) claim that after the issuance of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 by the Financial and Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
accrual models are ineffective in detecting earnings management and Cohen, Dey, and Lys 
(2005) asserted firms tend to refer to actual transactions rather than accruals in earnings 
smoothing. These arguments introduce questions about the accounting treatment of operational 
activities. These assertations stimulate questions about the impact of the accounting methodology 
on earnings management strategies. In addition, the assumptions in much of the research 
surrounding earnings smoothing is grounded on the notion that derivatives are used to hedge risk 
and are always present in earnings smoothing strategies (Guay, & Kothari, 2003; Hentschel, & 
Kothari, 1999; Kawaller, 2004). However, it is uncertain that derivates are part of all earnings 
management strategies. Although derivatives have demonstrated hedging capabilities, 
understanding and managing the risks of exotic options, complex swaps, warrants, and other 
synthetic derivative contracts can be difficult and novice financial planners may forego risk 
hedging with insturments they do not understand (Hentschel, & Kothari, 1999).
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 Problem Statement 
Most firms in the S&P 500 index have been reporting smoothed earnings since the late 
1990s (Henock Louis, Huddart Steven J., 2008), inspiring questions from regulators, investors, 
and stakeholders about the accuracy of real economic earnings. The use of earning smoothing 
practicies is a problem because these activities introduce uncertainty in the accuracy and validity 
of the financial statements of publically traded firms (Epps, & Guthrie, 2007). The lack of clarity 
in financial reporting skews tax requirements of firms and reduces government tax liabilities, 
which results in a government subsidy that impacts all tax paying U.S. citizens (Boynton, 
Charles, E., Paul S. Dobbins, Paul, S., & Plesko, George, A. , 1992). Reporting smoothed 
earnings also distorts the financial position of companies traded on financial markets and impacts 
investors and employees who are invested in these companies and are reliant on the financial 
solvency of these companies (Aono, J.Y., & Guan, L., 2007). Earnings smoothing is a widely 
used tool that most firms use to minimize earnings volatility and it is possible for two 
fundamental reasons (Barton, J., 2001). GAAP standards do not address all possible situations, 
and other times, financial managers are faced conflicting standards. These facts make it difficult 
to determine which standard to follow. (Ball, & Brown, 1968). Regulation and mandates must be 
general enough to address all possible situations and therefore the accounting standards must 
have some flexibility to allow the standards to keep up with changes in business practices 
(Wallison, & Hassett, 2004). The another weakness in GAAP is that, under conditions where 
GAAP does provide a framework of accounting standards, managers still have some degree of 
discretion over how the rules are applied. For example, when reporting financials and compliant 
with GAAP, managers may select the type of financial model they wish to implement for the 
measurement of the fair value of financial derivatives, or they may exercise discretion in the 
designation of a derivative hedge (Wallison & Hassett, 2004). 
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Pubilc firms are primary users of financial derivatives because derivatives can be used to 
hedge risks, reduce expenses, and improve earnings (GAO Report, 1996). The problem with the 
existing regulation is the provision for the exercise of subjective descretion in the utilization of 
fair value models. The existance of this provision stimulates the issue of divergent models across 
firms and leads to the abuse of derivative instruments (Financial Economists Roundtable, 1994). 
A survey conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute (2006), reported that 
since 2005, there has been an increase in publications on the lack of earnings guidance (Hagart, & 
Knoepfelon, 2006). Prior research (Jones, 1991; DeGeorge, 1999; & Barton, 2001) refers to 
accounting accruals in the detection of earnings management. However, after the issuance of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, a study conducted by Nissim and Penman (2003) revealed 
findings that did not support the existence of accrual modeling for earnings management.  
From an earnings management perspective, this study differs from prior research in two 
ways. First this study’s reference to earnings management reflects a firm’s ongoing operating 
activities, whereas prior studies’ references to earnings management reflected debt covenant 
violations (Dechow, 1996),  management bonus incentives (Gaver, Austin, & Gaver, 1995), and 
changes in tax laws (Newberry, 2001). In addition, this investigation of earnings management 
activities includes an examination of earnings smoothing through the use of accounting accruals 
then compares these results to real cash earnings whereas prior studies focus on accounting 
accruals exclusively (Bartov, & Gul, 2001; Collins, & Hribar, 2000; Hribar, & Collins, 2002; & 
Subramanyam, 1996). 
 The examination of total cash earnings contrasted with total net accruals is conducted for 
two reasons. According to Nissim and Penman (2003), after SOX  implementation, accrual 
models are ineffective in the detection of earnings management activities and according to Cohen, 
firms tend to use real financial transactions instead of accounting accruals in smoothing earnings. 
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(Cohen et al., 2004). The focus of this study is on the high technology industry segment 
exclusively due to the income conservative practices of the firms in this industry segment (Uday, 
Wasley , & Waymire, 2004). Conservatism is defined as the higher verification standard applied 
to favorable information that results in lower cumulative earnings and net assets (Watts, 2003). 
The presence of income conservatism is realized in significantly higher proportions of losses and 
lower average profitability levels for technology firms relative to non-technology firms (Kwon, 
Yin, & Han, 2006). High technology  firms confront higher degrees of risks in shareholder 
litigation than firms in other industries (Lobo, & Zhou, 2006) and are also affected to a greater 
degree by conservative accounting standards on research and development costs (Uday, Wasley, 
& Waymire, 2004).  
Nature of the Study 
This is a descriptive, comparative, and correlational research study that uses quantitative 
methods to describe phenomena, as they exist. The data used in this analysis is not manipulated or 
controlled. The nature of this study is to investigate earnings management (earnings smoothing) 
and transparency in financial reporting. Earnings smoothing is achieved through the use of 
accounting accruals and derivative hedging. The focus of this evaluation begins with a 
comparative evaluation of the aggregate differences in means of total cash earnings and total 
accounting accruals for the periods 1997 through 2007. The intent is to determine if a statistically 
significant difference exists between total cash earnings and total net accruals. The degree of 
earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals is conducted with a correlational 
evaluation of the average total assets, sales, accounts receivable, plant property and equipment, 
and total net accruals. The correlational examination used in this study follows a modified Jones 
model and takes the form of multiple regression evaluation. The correlational relationships 
9
between the independent variables (a) average total assets, (b) sales, (c) accounts receivable, (d) 
plant, property, and equipment, (e) and total net accruals are analyzed. The evaluation includes an 
examination of the explanatory power of the regression model. Estimated regression equations 
are developed to model non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals are determined for 
all firms for the period 1997 through 2007.  
Once the aggregate discretionary components of total net accruals have been determined 
for all firms in periods 1997 through 2007, the proportion of the use of discretionary accruals is 
evaluated by comparing population proportions of discretionary accrual levels in 2000 with those 
of 2005. This discretionary accrual comparison illustrates the levels of earnings management 
activities defined by the use of discretionary accruals before and after the issuance of SOX in 
2002.  
The impact of derivative hedging is investigated by comparing the variance in the rate of 
change in total cash earnings with the variance of the rate of change in total cash earnings without 
derivative hedging. The level of transparency in financial reporting is investigated by the 
development of an un-weighted index measure that is used to evaluate the disclosure quality of 
published financial statements and annual reports. Firms who reported the use of derivative 
hedging in their financial statements and annual reports are evaluated with the use of a quality 
disclosure index score (QDI). A population proportion test is used to investigate the proportional 
differences in QDI scores of firms who reported the use of derivative hedging in 1998 and 2002. 
The objective of this evaluation is to analyze the proportional differences of derivative reporting 
before and after FASB issued SFAS No. 133. 
This study is an empirical study with a quantitative methodology. From a branch in 
philosophy, epistemology is used to investigate the basic nature of knowledge, including its 
sources and validation (AERA, 2006). The focus of this study is on the nature of concepts and the 
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relation between abstractions and concrete particulars in earnings management and financial 
reporting. A traditional ex post facto research approach (Heiman, 1995) is used in this analysis 
due to reference to published financial statements and annual reports.  
Simple random assignment of participants is used to maximize study controls. This 
evaluation takes the form of a quasi experimental design because, although random assignment is 
used to obtain the data, the order control of the levels of the independent variable in a random 
design cannot be satisfied (AERA, 2006). A posttest-only design with two or more treatment 
levels is used. In this case, as the intervention have two or more levels; one group for each 
condition is used as:  
1. Total cash earnings for the years 1997 - 2007 
2. Total net accruals for the years 1997 - 2007 
3. Discretionary accruals for year 2000 
4. Discretionary accruals for year 2005 
5. Total cash earnings with derivative hedging for years 1997 – 2007 
6. Total cash earnings without derivative hedging for years 1997 – 2007 
7. Quality of derivative hedge reporting score for year 1998 
8. Quality of derivative hedge reporting score for year 2002 
There is similarity of the groups in financial reporting requirements and SIC code 
definitions. This similarity is instrumental for making valid conclusions (Seaver, 1973). This 
study requires the registration of the values of an independent variable and afterwards, measuring 
the dependent variable and therefore the methodology follows a prospective design (Dunham, 
1988). More than one independent variable is referenced for evaluation and therefore this 
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prospective design is factorial in nature. To satisfy this requirement, participants are selected 
because of a particular combination of characteristics (Dunham, 1988). In this case, all firms 
randomly selected for the sample must have complete data for the entire period 1997 – 2007. 
Once independent variables are identified (for the modified Jones model regressions), their effect 
(the dependent variable, i.e., discretionary accruals) is measured.  
This is a single-subject experiment because in this analysis, only one subject is an 
experimental object (firms classified by SIC code as high technology firms with financial data for 
the entire period 1997 - 2007) and I as the researcher, serves as the control. This investigation can 
also be defined as a no-reversal design (AB). In a no-reversal design, it is impossible to stop 
treatment (Dunham, 1988). In this evaluation, it is impossible to stop treatment because, although 
the modified Jones model is used for analysis and allows the breakout discretionary accruals from 
non-discretionary accruals, the original values reported in financial statements remain intact and 
unchanged. The modified Jones model simply draws out hidden values imbedded in reported 
values.  
Research Questions 
There are five research questions in this study. The research questions addressed in this 
evaluation are:  
1. What is the difference, if any, in the average earnings between total net accruals 
and total cash earnings? 
The structure of research question 1 is: 
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Table 1 Research Question 1: Research Approach









cash earnings and 
total net accruals  





average total net 
accruals.  
The objective is to 
determine if a statistical 
significant difference 
exists between the 
aggregate total cash 
earnings and total net 
accruals for periods 1997 
through 2007. A t test is 
conducted to investigate 
the difference in means 
of total cash earnings 
and total net accruals.  
T test 
H1: 1 2 H0: 1  = 2
 Where:   
total cash 
earnings






  total net 
accruals
Research question 2 is: 
2. What is the relationship among the average total assets, the change in sales, the 
change in accounts receivable, gross property plant, and equipment and total net 
accruals among high tech industry firms? 
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The structure of research question 2 is: 


















and total net 
accruals. 
There is a no 
relationship 
between average 





total net accruals. 
The objective is to 




among average total 
assets, sales, 
accounts receivable, 
plant property and 
equipment, and total 
net accruals. The 




accruals for the 
periods 1997 
through 2007 using 




Research question 3 is: 
3. What is the difference, if any, between the proportion of discretionary accruals used 
in 2000 and the proportion of discretionary accruals used in 2005 (before and after 
SOX implementation)? 
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The structure of research question 3 is: 
Table 3 Research Question 3: Research Approach 
Research 
Type  
Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis Objective Analysis
descriptive, 
comparative 
The proportion of 
firms with more than 
50% of discretionary 
accruals embedded in 
total net accruals in 
year 2000 is not equal 
to the proportion of 
firms with more than 
50% of discretionary 
accruals embedded in 
total net accruals in 
year 2005 
The proportion of 
firms with more than 
50% of discretionary 
accruals embedded in 
total net accruals in 
year 2000 is equal to 
the proportion of firms 
with more than 50% of 
discretionary accruals 
embedded in total net 
accruals in year 2005. 
The objective is to 




accruals exist and 
are statistically 
significant for 
years 2000 and 
2005.  
T test  
H1: p1  p2 H0: p1 = p2 
Where: Where: 
p1= number of firms 
who reported more 
than 50% of 
discretionary accruals 
in year 2000 
p1= number of firms 
who reported more 
than 50% of 
discretionary accruals 
in year 2000 
p2 = number of firms 
who reported more 
than 50% of 
discretionary accruals 
in year 2005 
p2 = number of firms 
who reported more 
than 50% of 
discretionary accruals 
in year 2005 
Research question 4 is: 
4. What is the difference, if any, in the rate of change in total cash earnings with 
derivative hedging and the rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative 
hedging? 
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The structure of research question 4 is: 
Table 4 Research Question 4: Research Approach
Research 
Type  
Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis Objective Analysis
descriptive, 
comparative 
The variance of the rate 
of change in total cash 
earnings of firms 
without derivative 
hedging is equal to or 
greater than the 
variance of the rate of 
change in total cash 
earnings of firms with 
derivative hedging. The 
equal condition is 
accounted for by 
measuring the standard 
deviation of the rate of 
change in total cash 
earnings with and 
without derivative 
hedging. 
The variance of the rate 
of change in total cash 
earnings of firms 
without derivative 
hedging is less than the 
variance of the rate of 
change in total cash 
earnings of firms with 
derivative hedging. The 
equal condition is 
accounted for by 
measuring the standard 
deviation of the rate of 
change in total cash 
earnings with and 
without derivative 
hedging.  
The objective is 
to determine if 
the rate of 
change in total 




greater than the 
rate of change in 
total cash 
earnings of firms 
who do use 
derivative 
hedging.  
F- test  
 H0 : 
2/1
2/2    H1 : 
2/1 < 
2/2   
Where:  Where:  
2/1 = rate of change in 
TCE without derivative 
hedging 
2/1 = rate of change in 
TCE without derivative 
hedging 
2/2 = rate of change in 
TCE with derivative 
hedging 
2/2 = rate of change in 
TCE with derivative 
hedging 
Research question 5 is: 
5. What is the proportional difference, if any, in the transparency of derivative reporting 
between firms who used derivative hedging in 1998 and those who used derivative 
hedges in 2002? 
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The structure of research question 5 is: 
Table 5 Research Question 5: Research Approach 
Research 
Type  





The proportion of 
firms in 1998 with 
quality disclosure 
index scores above 
80% is greater than 
or equal to the 
proportion of firms 
in 2002 with quality 
disclosure index 
scores above 80%.  
The proportion of 
firms in 1998 with 
quality disclosure 
index scores above 
80% is less than the 
proportion of firms 
in 2002 with quality 
disclosure index 
scores above 80%.  
The objective is to 
determine if the 
proportion of quality 
disclosure index scores 
(QDI) of firms in 1998 
is greater than the 
proportion of quality 
QDI scores in 2002 
(before and after SFAS 
No. 133).  
T test 
H0: p1  p2  H1: p1 < p2 The QDI is a measure 
of the quality of 
reporting transparency.  
Where:  Where:  
p1= number of firms 
with QDI scores 
above 80% in 1998 
p1= number of firms 
with QDI scores 
above 80% in 1998 
p2 = number of firms 
with QDI scores 
above 80% in 2002 
p2 = number of 
firms with QDI 
scores above 80% 
in 2002 
A more detailed discussion of the application of this framework is provided in chapter 3. 
     Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to determine if earnings smoothing is increasing 
in the high technology industry segment and to determine if public firms in the high technology 
industry segment have shifted away from accounting accruals and towards real earnings 
management activities in the post-SOX period (following highly publicized accounting scandals). 
SFAS  No. 133 establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, 
including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts and for hedging activities 
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(Guay, & Kothari, 2003). Released in June 1998, SFAS No.133 represents the culmination of the 
US Financial Accounting Standards Board's effort to develop a comprehensive framework for 
derivatives and hedge accounting (Hentschel, & Kothari, 1999). The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board establishes generally accepted accounting principles for most companies 
operating in the United States or requiring financial statements meeting GAAP requirements. The 
intent of this regulation is to provide transparency, consistency, and stability to financial reporting 
for derivative hedges. The SFAS No. 133 is myriad of layers of amended accounting regulation 
and standards (Huang, Ryan, & Wiggins, 2007). The language of SFAS No. 133 allows flexibility 
in fair value accounting and some of the regulation dates back to SFAS 52. In this evaluation, an 
analysis of derivative hedging activities includes an investigation of transparency in derivative 
hedge reporting before and after SFAS No. 133.  
Theoretical Framework 
The Jones model was created in 1991 by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney and modified by 
adding the change in receivables in 1995. The modified Jones model is an evaluation 
methodology used to segment discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals. The model 
uses a multiple regression to estimate the non-discretionary accrual proxy and provides a more 
robust framework of analysis for measuring accounting accruals. The regression used in the Jones 
model references independent variables that have some relationship to non-discretionary accruals. 
Normal accruals are driven by sales, PP&E, expected sales growth and current operating 
performance, and are used for the independent variables of the Jones model. The model proposes 
normal accrual components can be used to predict the non-discretionary component of total 
accruals. The difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals yields the 
discretionary accruals. The intent is to determine how to what degree specific factors in normal 
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accruals influence the level of non-discretionary accruals. The modified Jones model is used in 
this evaluation to segment non-discretionary accruals from discretionary accruals for the sample 
firms in periods 1997 through 2007.This model has been used by many researchers (Bartov, et.al., 
2001) in the area of earnings management. In 1992, Boynton, Dobbins and Plesko utilized the 
modified Jones model and incorporated working capital accruals (Boynton, Dobbins, & Plesko, 
1992). In 1999, Navissi used the modified Jones model to evaluate accruals but used a time series 
rather than a cross-sectional framework of analysis (Bowman, Navissi, & Burgess, 1991). Many 
researchers have referenced the modified Jones model (Subramanyam, 1996; Guay, Kothari, & 
Watts, 1996; Collins, & Hribar, 1999; Peasnell, & Pope, 2000; & Gaver, Austin, & Gaver, 1995). 
but have altered the independent variables by incorporating factors that reflect cash flow accruals 
and working capital such as sales and accounts receivable. In 1994, Hiemstra and Jones used the 
modified Jones model to determine if the incremental information content in discretionary 
accruals reflects management decisions to smooth earnings. 
Earnings management activities during initial public offerings have also been conducted 
with the use of a modified Jones model (Roosenboom, Goot, & Mertens, 2003); Shen and Chih 
(2005) based the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) and 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) approaches to their studies about the banking sector in 48 
countries. In their study, Shen and Chih (2005) calculated the discretionary accruals with three 
models. Their first model included 42 countries, the second model included 47 countries and the 
last model included 48 countries, all of which revealed discretionary accruals possessed an 
average different than zero. 
In recent years, accrual models have been used to investigate earnings management 
activities in a particular area such as sales and book value of assets (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003). Similarly, Myers, Meyers and Omer explored the term of the auditor-client relationship
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defined by the length of time the auditor spends with the client and used earnings quality in the 
dispersion and sign of both the absolute Jones model abnormal accruals and absolute current 
accruals as proxies for earnings quality (Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003). In 2004, Louis and Park 
investigated the relationship between earnings management and market performance with the 
sales and receivable items, while Shin researched the effect of the board of director's composition 
on the earnings management in Canada by using the sales and leverage rate in 2004 (Henock, 
2004). Coppens and Peek (2005) researched the earnings management activities by incorporating 
variables such as working capital, depreciation, and receivables.   
The quality of reporting in financial statements is a major concern for investors, 
regulators, and stakeholders. A number of previous studies have investigated the quality of 
corporate disclosure as measured by information disclosed in the annual reports and other media 
(Imhoff, 1992; Sengupta, 1998; Riahi-Belkaouhi, 2001; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001; & Shaw, 
2002). This study also measures transparency and overall quality of reporting by developing an 
un-weighted reporting index. All firms who reported the use of derivative hedging are 
investigated with an un-weighted scoring index. The results of the scoring are then tested with a 
population proportion test to investigate the proportional differences the quality disclosure 
reporting of firms in 1998 and 2002 (before and after SFAS No. 133).  
Discretionary Accrual Modeling 
Although there are many different approaches to estimate this non-discretionary accrual 
proxy, estimating the non-discretionary component of accruals typically involves a linear 
regression model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). The first step is to identify the dependent 
variable and the independent variables and to determine whether to use a cross-sectional model or 
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a time-series model for the data analysis. For a more detailed explanation of the proposed 
research approach, refer to chapter 3.  
Definition of Terms 
A complete list of definitions and references provided in this section will explain the 
meaning of these references. Other references clearly defined in the text are not duplicated in this 
section. 
Accounting Accrual: the difference between operating earnings and operating cash flow, 
which represents the element of earnings subject to management discretion under the generally 
accounting principles (GAAP). (Anderson, Caldwell, & Needles, 1994, p.565). 
Accounting Actual: the actual value of items sold or purchased by a firm. (Anderson, 
Caldwell, & Needles, 1994). 
Derivative: a financial contract whose value is derived from the price of another asset 
(the underlying asset) (Barton, 2001). 
Earnings: the reported earnings before extraordinary items, which represents the earnings 
of a firm after all expenses, income taxes, and minority interest, but before preferred dividends, 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Philbrick & Ricks, 1991).  
Earnings Management: an effort “to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a 
smooth earnings path” (Levitt, 1998). Earnings management is defined in the accounting 
literature as “distorting the application of generally accepted accounting principles.” (Dechow et 
al., 2003). 
Earnings Smoothing:  a unique case of earnings management, it tries to make earnings 
appear less volatile over time (Dechow et al., 2003). This is consistent with SEC’s definition of 
earnings management. 
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Hedging: taking a derivative position that results in a gain (loss) in the contract and a loss 
(gain) in the asset or liability. (Barton, 2001). 
Operating Cash Flow: the cash generated by the operation of business. (Anderson, 
Caldwell, & Needles, 1994). 
Operating Earnings: the earnings from continuing operation of the business. (Anderson, 
Caldwell, & Needles, 1994,). 
     Limitations and Delimitations 
The high technology industry segment is selected for this study where income 
conservatism has been the rule of practice (Kwon, Yin, & Han, 2006). A limitation of this study 
is that the inferences and generalizations only apply to the high technology industry segment. In 
addition, by restricting the sample to include only U.S. companies, the study inferences and 
generalizations are limited to publically traded U.S. companies. Non-profit and government 
organizations are outside the scope of this analysis.  
Significance of the Study 
This research fills the gap in the earnings management literature including the 
transparency of financial reporting. This study provides evidence to managers, investors, and 
legislators that earning smoothing activities are increasing. The accounting treatment of 
operational activities and their impact on the stability of reported earnings in the high technology 
industry segment are addressed. Regulations specifically passed by Congress to address 
transparency in financial reporting (SOX) and to address derivative hedging (SFAS No. 133) are 
investigated. A literature review of research conducted in the area of earnings management is 
provided in chapter 2. This research improves upon previous research by studying earnings 
22
management without preference to use of accruals or actual transactions. Few studies on earnings 
smoothing have focused on actual financial transactions and others on accrual transactions 
(Brown, & Caylor, 2005; & Coppens & Peek, 2005); however none have  attempted to compare 
the two approaches. In addition, the transparency in financial reporting of firms who use 
derivative hedging is explored and augments existing literature in the area of earnings 
management. The research approach is explained in chapter 3, with the findings in chapter 4, and 
the inferences and conclusions in chapter 5. 
CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals and 
derivative hedging is the focus of this literature review. In this section, a review of related 
research is provided, including an evaluation of existing regulation formulated by FASB. The 
strategy used for searching the literature is grounded on the existence of financial regulation 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP), 
which were created to minimize earnings management activities and to enhance the transparency 
in financial reporting. An extensive exploration of discretionary accruals is conducted and 
includes an evaluation of peer reviewed research studies that focused on alternative approaches to 
earnings management detection and evaluation. The first section of this chapter addresses the 
structure of existing financial directives and investigates the financial implications of areas not 
addressed with existing regulation. The calculations of accruals are explained and the estimation 
of abnormal accruals is evaluated. Derivative hedging and systematic risk is explored and 
incentives to hedging against risk are presented. The chapter ends with an evaluation of derivative 
hedging under SFAS No. 133 for accounting discretion and the implications to the transparency 
in financial reporting for derivative hedging.   
The practice of earnings manipulation in financial reporting has existed as long as 
financial documents have been used as a tool for evaluation. Earnings management is defined by 
the practice of manipulating reported earnings so that the financial peaks and troughs are 
smoothed out. In essence, earnings “…do not accurately represent economic earnings at every 
point in time” (McKee, 2005, p. 112). Jin (2005) asserted earnings management practices have 
always existed. 
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Earnings management is extensively documented in financial literature (Bannister & 
Newman, 1996; Beidlerman, 1973; Subramanyam, 1996; Moses, 1987). Collingwood (2001) 
examined the intricacies of the earnings smoothing and explored the reasons companies employ 
this type of financial manipulation. In this study, Collingwood asserted changes in executive 
practices is needed to improve the accuracy of financial reporting.  
Review of Related Research  
When investors, regulators, and other stakeholders reference financial information of 
publically traded firms, they are generally confident that those reported numbers are reliable 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). The reliability of the reported numbers are exposed to a degree of 
risk as a result of the discretion allowed in performance modeling and reporting under GAAP 
(Gerry, 2003). Burgstahler and Dichev demonstrate the implications of risk exposure in their 
1997 study that revealed some managers manage earnings to avoid reporting a loss and to meet 
analysts’ expectations. Chaney et al., also illustrates this notion in a study conducted of accruals 
and income smoothing published in 1996. As Chaney stated, managers seeking to lower the 
perceived risk of the financial stability do so by reducing the variation of inter-period earnings 
(earnings smoothing) which in turn reduces the cost of capital for the firm (Chaney, Jeter, & 
Lewis, 1998). These practices create artificially inflated stock prices and reduce the number of 
price decreases, which signifies financial stability and allows the firm to sell stock at a higher 
price. This simulated financial position provides managers justification to collect bonuses and 
exercise options (Healy, 1985). Earnings smoothing strategies are also used to stabilize financial 
reporting required for government funding and project subsidies (Jones, 1991).  
In this section, earnings smoothing through the utilization of discretionary accruals and 
derivative hedging is explored. The discretionary accrual section of the literature review includes 
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an examination of the implications of SOX on earnings smoothing and financial reporting. The 
accounting treatment of operational activities is also examined by evaluating earning volatility 
and stability in financial reporting. The derivative hedging section includes an examination of 
hedging practices and implications. This section also includes an examination of the research on 
the quality of derivative reporting and the transparency of financial statements.   
Discretionary Accruals Activity under SOX 
Epps and Guthrie (2007) investigated the material weakness of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404 [SOX 404] that allows managers of firms to manipulate earnings to a greater extent 
using discretionary accruals than managers of firms with no SOX 404 material weaknesses. The 
Epps and Guthrie study focused on companies that disclosed at least one material weakness in 
internal controls within their 2004 SEC filings. In this investigation, the discretionary accruals of 
companies with material weaknesses were paired with companies with no reported material 
weaknesses during the same period. The focus of the study examined the relationship of reported 
SOX 404 weaknesses with the behavior of discretionary accruals for the companies and for 
discretionary accruals partitioned by the greatest magnitudes (both positive and negative). The 
accruals were then categorized by degree of discretionary accrual performance. The findings 
suggested the presence of SOX 404 material weaknesses stimulated a moderate negative effect on 
discretionary accruals. However, when the accruals were stratified into high positive, negative, 
and low accruals, the overall findings of the research suggests that the existence of material 
weaknesses allows for greater manipulation of financial earnings using discretionary accruals 
regardless of income increasing or income decreasing (Epps, & Guthrie, 2007). 
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2004) evaluated discretionary accruals under SOX regulations in 
2004. This analysis revealed an increase in accounting accruals in the two years before SOX and 
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during major financial scandals and a sharp decrease following the issuance of SOX Lobo and 
Zhou (2006) reported lower discretionary accruals after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. 
In the Lobo and Zhou study, firms incorporated losses more quickly into their earnings in the post 
SOX period. This study provided further evidence of the impact of corporate governance on 
managers' discretionary accounting decisions. The research findings of the success of SOX in the 
minimization of discretionary accrual activities are inconclusive. Specifically, in 2005 Cohen, 
Dey, and Lys reported firms engage in less earnings management post-SOX, yet in 2006, Lobo 
and Zhou find that firms report earnings more conservatively. However, reporting more 
conservatively may be consistent with an increase in earnings management activities  
Earnings Management through GAAP Discretions 
An example of GAAP discretions can be found in the authorization of varying inventory 
models and depreciation schedules. Regulations in these particular areas are vague (Zeff, 2005) 
because the language used in these regulations allow for managerial discretion in its’ application 
and allow alternative accounting treatment that permits companies to adapt their reporting 
methods to reflect their perspective of the firm’s financial position. For example, two companies 
experiencing the exact same economic events may use different inventory methods (such as 
FIFO, LIFO, or JIT) and depreciation schedules (straight line, step-down, or accelerated) and thus 
report different quarterly and annual earnings figures. In addition, under GAAP, firms can choose 
alternative methods to account for company performance that result in a distortion of financial 
performance (Zeff, 2005). With few exceptions, GAAP requires research and development costs 
to be expensed as they are incurred. The costs are reconciled against revenues of the current 
period, not against future revenue streams they are formulated to generate. This reporting 
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structure results in understated earnings in current periods and overstated earnings in future 
periods (Gerry, 2003). 
In 2003, Gerry argued that the GAAP provided discretions for firms to practice earnings 
management and in 2003; Tarpley identified patterns of earnings management with a study of 515 
earnings management attempts obtained from a survey of 253 auditors. In 2006, Lobo and Zhou 
examined changes in discretionary accruals following SOX. In their evaluation, they found that 
firms reported lower discretionary accruals after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. 
Earnings smoothing is still a common practice and will continue to be as long as value is linked to 
earnings stability.  
Discretionary Accruals  
There is a long history of regulation forged to minimize earnings manipulation and 
enhance transparency in financial reporting (Mills, & Newberry, 2001; Wallison, & Hassett, 
2004; Zhou, 2007). The interest of analysts, regulators, and investors in general about techniques 
that can identify earnings manipulation by the firm’s management has been the focus of existing 
financial literature dedicated to earnings management since the early 1970s. Most research 
methods focused on the evidence of earnings management rely on the calculation of accounting 
accruals and their separation from non-discretionary accruals (Bartov, & Gul, 2001). 
Discretionary accruals are considered abnormal or unexpected whereas the non-discretionary 
components are considered the expected accrual values stimulated by business cycles (Guay, 
Kothari, & Watts, 1996). After the discretionary accrual component is separated, statistical tests 
are used to determine if the discretionary accruals of the firm differ from zero, the normal, or 
expected value.  
28
Despite all the generated interest and abundant literature in earnings management, a 
consensus about superiority in the estimation of discretionary accruals does not exist. Guidelines 
or axioms about how to estimate these models in order to improve the power of the tests are in 
their early stages and there have been few attempts to develop recommendations (Guay, 1995, 
Dechow, 1995; Jones, 1991) for evaluation in this area of study. An evaluation of the existing 
literature in discretionary accruals is explored. 
A New Approach to Evaluating Accruals 
Some early attempts to develop standards for analyzing discretionary accruals can be 
found in the works of Guay et al (1995) and Dechow et al (1995) and in Young (1999). These 
early studies concentrate on models created by Healy in 1985, DeAngelo in 1986, and the Jones 
model in 1991. There have been several attempts to account for the relation between accruals and 
cash flows such as Hunt in 1997, which augmented the Jones model with the addition of a cash 
flow variable (Hunt, Moyer, & Shevlin, 1997).  
In 1996, Shivakumar augmented the Jones model by adding five cash flow variables. An 
alternative model was introduced in 2000 by Garza-Gómez that was based on cash flow from 
operations, which they named the Accounting Process (AP) model. The AP model uses the term 
(1/A t-1) as an explanatory variable and is estimated without intercept. The discretionary accrual 
component shows a large bias when the (1/A t-1) is used (Garza-Gómez, Okumura, & Kunimura, 
2000) and concerns about the methodology of discretionary accruals remains.   
Evaluating Abnormal Accruals  
Segmenting total accruals into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component is a 
difficult task. The discretion exercised by management is unobservable and there are economic 
events that stimulate changes in total accruals from one year to the next (Jeter, & Shivakumar, 
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1999). When a researcher estimates discretionary accruals, they are forcing an expectation model 
of the expected behavior of accruals in relation to economic events (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 
2005). Most of the models require the estimation of one or more parameters (Guay, Kothari, & 
Watts, 1996). Two methodologies can be found in the literature of earnings management and 
accrual evaluation. The time-series approach includes the estimation of parameters for each firm 
in the sample by referencing data from periods prior to the current period under review. In 
contrast, the cross-sectional approach provides estimates for each period for each firm in the 
event sample referencing data of firms in the same industry (Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996).  
DeChow and Guay utilize the time-series approach in their discretionary accrual 
evaluations. The disadvantage of using a time-series approach is that it introduces survivorship 
bias as well as selection bias, since the time-series model requires the existence of at least N + 1 
years of data (where N is the number of explanatory variables used n the model) (Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney, 1995). This limitation inherent in the time-series model reduces the explanatory 
power of short series financial data. The time-series approach is effective only when firms in the 
sample possess a long series of financial data. Guay requires 15 years of data in their evaluation 
of time-series discretionary accruals.  
In 1994, Defond and Jiambavolo introduced the cross-sectional method of discretionary 
accruals analysis. In this analysis, firms are separated by SIC code and the normal accruals are 
estimated using yearly cross sections (DeFond, & Jiambalvo, 1994). The assumption of this 
approach is that the situation for each year will affect the firms in the industry in a similar way. 
The cross-sectional approach is gaining stability in this area of research and is becoming the 
standard approach to estimate accrual models (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). 
In 1996, Subramanyam estimated the Jones model and the modified Jones model 
proposed by Dechow et al., (1995) and reported better a fit for the cross-sectional version than for 
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the time-series version of the model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). Subramanyam’s 
findings suggest the cross-sectional approach generates lower standard errors for the coefficients, 
fewer outliers, and coefficients that better fit the predicted signs as measured against the time-
series approach (Shivakumar, 1996). Jeter and Shivakumar also argued in favor of the cross-
sectional estimation method over the time-series approach. Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) contend 
industry-relative abnormal accruals can be a useful tool for researchers attempting to detect the 
average unconditional earnings management found in the industry. 
Discretionary Accrual Modeling 
In Jones model introduced in 1991, is a regression-based expectation model that controls 
for variations in non-discretionary accruals associated with the depreciation charge as well as 
changes in economic activities (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). The Jones model is 
expressed as: 
 [TAt  /At-1] = NDAt = 1(1/At-1) + 1( REVt /At-1) + 2(PPEt /At-1 )   (1)
Where; REVt = change in revenue from period t-1 to t  
NDAt = non-discretionary accruals  
At = assets  
REV = change in revenue 
PPEt = gross plant property and equipment 
Jones (1991) argued that the change in revenue ( REV) and property plant and 
equipment (PPE) terms are used as a control for the non-discretionary component of total accruals 
associated with changes in operating activity and level of depreciation. Dechow et al (1995) 
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argued the assumption that all revenue changes in the Jones models are non-discretionary; the 
resulting measure of discretionary accruals does not reflect the impact of sales based 
manipulation. As a result, Dechow attempted to capture revenue manipulation and altered the 
Jones model by subtracting the change in receivables ( REC) from REV for each sample firm. 
The modified Jones model becomes: 
 [TAt/At-1] = NDAt = 1(1/At-1) + 1( REVt/At-1- RECt/At-1) + 2(PPEt/At-1 )  (2) 
Calculation of Accruals 
The literature to date that focuses on accruals includes two main approaches to calculate the 
accrual components of earnings. The balance sheet approach, estimates accruals as: 
TAbst = ( CAt - Casht) – ( CLt - STDt)-DEPTNt)     (3) 
Where; CAt = change in current assets during period t  
Cash = change in cash 
CLt = change in current liabilities during period t 
STDt = the current maturities of long term debt and other short-term debt included in 
current liabilities during period t 
DEPTNt = depreciation and amortization expense during period t 
The total accruals are subtracted from earnings to estimate cash flow from operations (CFOt) as 
follows: 
CFOt = EBXIt – TAtbs          (4) 
Where; EBXIt = net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
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TAtbs = total accruals 
CFOt = cash flows from operations 
The Balance Sheet approach is used to evaluate accruals by DeChow in 1994; Guay, Kothari and 
Watts in 1995, and Subramanyam in 1996.  
 The balance sheet approach to evaluating accrual activity has come under criticism by 
Hansen, Collins and Hribar who argue bias is introduced into the estimates of discretionary 
accruals under discounted operations, investments and disinvestments in capital expenditures and 
other activities that skew the financial statements during the year (Collins, & Hribar, 2000). In 
2002, Collins and Hribar introduced an alternative approach to discretionary accrual evaluation. 
Under this approach, the researcher can calculate accruals directly from the statement of cash 
flows using the formula (Collins, & Hribar, 2002):  
TAcf = EBXI – CFOcf         (5) 
Where; TAcf = the total accrual adjustments provided on the cash flow statement under 
the indirect method  
EBXI = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
CFOcf = operating cash flows (from continuing operations) taken directly 
This method of calculating accruals by referencing the statement of cash flows is used in this 
evaluation of discretionary accruals. 
Accrual Modeling and Statistical Distribution Methodology 
Prior research on earnings management takes the form of two research designs: those 
based on accounting accruals (aggregate accruals, Jones, 1991; or specific accruals, DeGeorge et 
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al., 1999) and those based on the statistical distribution of earnings (Burgstahler, & Dichev, 
1997). The first design, also called “accrual model,” and is extensively used in earnings 
management literature (Bartov, et.al., 2001). Jones (1991) conducted a study on earnings 
management by establishing the normal accruals of a company and comparing them to the actual 
accruals reported. The premise behind this evaluation is grounded on the notion that the 
difference between discretionary accruals and normal accruals provides the evidence that an 
earnings management strategy is employed. 
The advantage of this design is that earnings management is easily detected under this 
definition of earnings management (Jones, 1991). The disadvantage is that accrual models 
(aggregate and specific) lack the theoretical foundation of other statistical models and can not 
reliably reflect the exercise of discretion (Nissim, & Penman, 2003). Nissim and Penman (2003), 
and Kothari (2005) also claimed that Jones’s and DeGeorge’s models (also called modified Jones 
model) could not detect earnings management after SOX. Cohen et al. (2004) found evidence of a 
decrease in accruals after the introduction of SOX in 2002 while Lobo and Zhou (2006) examined 
changes in discretionary accruals following SOX. The implementation of SOX introduces 
significantly greater penalties on CEO/CFOs; therefore, risk adverse managers are likely to be 
more conservative in their financial reporting, and report lower discretionary accruals following 
SOX (Liu, 2004) Firms with earnings manipulation by excessive accruals also face the risk of 
being sued by the SEC. So there are many penalties in place to deter earnings smoothing 
however, these regulations do not eliminate earnings smoothing strategies they merely make it 
more difficult to identify them. Empirical findings suggest that accruals models that do not 
consider long-term earnings growth are potentially undefined and may result in erroneous 
inferences about earnings management behavior. This makes it extremely difficult to establish 
sound estimates of discretionary accruals that capture discretion exercised by management and it 
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also introduces challenges in evaluating the appropriate research designs for earnings 
management research. Collins and Hribar (2000) provided an example of the gap between 
empirical procedures and knowledge of the behavior of reported financial statements. The 
measurement error in discretionary accrual estimates may lead the researcher to conclude that 
earnings management exists when it does not. 
The second approach to evaluate earnings management is to examine the statistical 
properties of earnings to identify behavior that influences earnings, as developed by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al., (1999). This is referred to as the Earnings Distribution 
Model. Earnings Distribution Models focus on the behavior of earnings around a specified 
benchmark, such as zero or a prior quarter's earnings. These types of tests attempt to evaluate 
whether the values of cash flows or accruals lie above or below an assigned benchmark and to 
determine if they are distributed smoothly and reflect volatility created by the use of management 
discretion.   
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also found volatility in the distribution of reported 
earnings around zero and around prior year’s earnings. While Degeorge et al., (1999) used 
analyst’s forecasts as a benchmark. Both these studies suggest that if firms had greater incentives 
to achieve earnings above a benchmark, then the distribution of earnings after management 
publishes the incentives would have fewer observations than expected for earnings amounts just 
below the benchmark, and more observations than expected for earnings just above the set 
benchmark. Both studies found significantly more observations than expected in the range above 
zero earnings, and in the range above the prior period's earnings. 
Gore et al. (2001) used 10,000 observations to study the distribution of earnings and 
found that fewer companies than expected reported earnings just below zero, and more companies 
than expected reported earnings just above zero. Similarly, fewer companies than expected 
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reported earnings just below last year’s figure, and more companies than expected reported 
earnings just above last year’s figure. However, it is unclear that this empirically indicates 
earnings management strategies are utilized. For example, a firm that reports higher earnings each 
year relative to earnings in the prior year would be viewed as a safe firm. On the other hand, 
under Gore’s theory; firms that report an increase in earnings in some years and decreases in 
others would be viewed as risky. Therefore it could be argued earnings management evaluations 
should target earnings decreases exclusively rather than increases in reported numbers.  
In 2002, Gore concluded that accruals are a significant part of the earnings management 
mechanisms used to boost reported earnings so as to just achieve target (Gore, Pope, & Singh, 
2002). The advantage of this method is that researchers can avoid the estimation of discretionary 
accruals. The disadvantage is that researchers can not tell the form and magnitude of earnings 
management. A noteworthy feature of this design is that the power of this approach comes from 
the specificity of their predictions regarding which group of firms will manage earnings, rather 
than from a better measure of discretion over earnings (Gore, Pope, & Singh, 2002). 
The Earnings Distribution Model is a powerful tool in the earnings management arsenal 
in that it identifies contexts in which large numbers of firms appear to manage earnings (Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). The approach also highlights the frequency of manipulation, though 
this rests on an assumption about the distribution of earnings without earnings manipulation. 
Myers and Skinner (1999), in the spirit of the Earnings Distribution Model, tested whether the 
frequency of increases in consecutive quarterly earnings were greater than would be expected by 
chance, and found that it was. In 2008, Allayannis, Roundtree, and Weston conducted an 
evaluation of cash flow volatility as valued by investors. The findings of this study are consistent 
with a preference by the market for less volatile cash flows and thus, suggesting that managers’ 
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efforts to generate smooth financial statements add value, but only through the cash component of 
earnings (Allayannis, Rountree, & Weston, 2008). 
A study conducted by the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (Department of 
Accountancy), found a negative relationship between risk aversion and the volatility of earnings 
and operating cash flows. In this investigation, CEO incentives to reduce earnings volatility were 
explained by the under diversified investment position in their companies’ stock. The risk of 
negative valuations inspired the creation of hedging devices to reduce earnings volatility (Abdel-
khalik, 2006). 
Direct Cash Flow Earnings Management Methodology 
  Currently, few studies focus on earnings manipulation via cash flows and real financial 
transactions as a means to manage earnings. In 2006, Tucker and Zarowin used a new approach to 
breakup earnings into two categories--cash flows and accruals (Tucker, & Zarowin, 2006). In 
2006, Tucker and Zarowin measured earnings management activities by evaluating the negative 
correlation of the change in accruals with the change in pre-managed earnings. According to 
Tucker and Zarowin, the volatility of earnings is the combination of the volatilities of cash flow 
and accruals. Under this theory, the following relationship holds:  
Var (earnings) = Var (cash flow) + Var (accruals) + 2 Covar (cash flow x accruals) (6) 
This formula suggests managers can change the outcome of their reported earnings by either 
manipulating the stability of accruals or by altering the level of cash flows (or both) (Tucker, & 
Zarowin, 2006). Under these conditions, a firm whose cash flow and earnings are exposed to 
interest rate risk can alter their reported earnings by exercising a derivative (cash flow). 
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Derivative Hedging and Systematic Risk 
Economic theory explains that the value of equity is equal to the present value of the 
expected risk-adjusted dividend, calculated using the risk-free rate of interest. Since interest rate 
risk can be hedged by using derivatives, the most important factor that impacts a firm is the value 
of future dividends (earnings). Theoretically, higher earnings that are consistently stable will 
stimulate dividend growth and increase firm value. Market imperfections increase systematic risk, 
which refers to inherent risk in the market and created by the movements of the entire economy 
(Emery, & Finnerty, 1997). Systematic risk cannot be diversified away but can be hedged with 
financial derivatives (Melumad, Weyns, & Ziv, 1999). If earnings volatility is costly to a firm, 
then the firm is faced with incentives to reduce its exposures to risks by reducing the volatilities 
of its earnings and may choose to utilize derivative hedges to minimize risk exposure (Emery, 
Douglas, & Finnerty, 1997). 
Beaver et al. (2000) examined the earnings management incentives of public and private 
property and casualty insurance firms, and found that they both avoid losses by using hedging 
derivatives. Similarly, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) provided evidence that firms that meet or 
beat analysts’ earnings forecasts consistently were valued higher than firms that failed to do so. 
Bruns et al., (1990) provided evidence that “…in practice, it appears that a majority of managers 
use at least some methods to manage short-term earnings.” (Bruns, & Merchant, 1990). 
Derivative Hedging Incentives 
DeGeorge et al., (1999) hypothesized that firm managers had various incentives to avoid 
reporting a decline in earnings. In fact, the theoretical value of a company’s stock is the present 
value of its future earnings and increased earnings represent an increase in shareholder value 
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(Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999). Beatty et al., (2002) also found that the number of 
publicly-held firms reporting continuous increases in earnings per share was unusually high, and 
the number was low in privately-held firms. They asserted the cause for this earnings behavior 
was the result of required reporting and argued that public firms were more concerned about firm 
value, while private firms were more concerned about income tax burdens (Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 
2002). Burgstahler and Eames (2003), Degeorge et al., (1999), and Dechow et al. (2003) 
illustrated the same empirical regularity of earnings smoothing however, provided little empirical 
evidence to explain this pattern. While Hong and Kyonghee examined management incentives to 
smooth earnings (Hong, Keejae & Kyonghee, 2009),   Lapointe-Antunes, Magnan, and Gray-
Angers, examined the voluntary disclosure patterns made by Swiss firms with constrains on the 
use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. In their analysis they explored the effect of 
voluntary disclosure on the value relevance of earnings (Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, Magnan, & 
Gray-Angers, 2006). 
A survey conducted in 2004 indicated that a majority of firms were willing to forfeit 
economic value in exchange for stable earnings (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 
2004).Kirschenheiter and Melumand studied a model of financial reporting where investors infer 
the precision of reported earnings. They found reporting a larger earnings surprise reduces the 
inferred earnings precision, dampening the impact on firm value of reporting higher earnings, and 
providing a natural demand for smoother earnings (Kirschenheiter, & Melumad, 2002). This is 
the main force that is driving earnings management practice of managers.  
Liu and Yao (2003) asserted that the market value was higher for earnings-stable stocks 
than for earnings-volatile stocks. Based on their sample firms, from 1985 to 2000, earnings-stable 
stocks significantly outperformed earnings-volatile stocks in returns (Liu, & Yao, 2003). McKee 
(2005) claimed that firms with lower earnings volatility were being valued higher than the firms 
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with higher earnings volatility (McKee, 2005). However, given the current market and the 
inherent volatility and consumer uncertainty, Collingwood asserted there is no financial benefit 
for earnings smoothing (Collingwood, 2001). 
Derivative Hedging 
The use of financial derivatives is widespread, particularly among large publicly traded 
firms. Derivatives are to speculate or to hedge against risk (Emery, & Finnerty, 1997). As 
described in chapter 1, this study is concerned with hedging rather than speculating with 
derivatives however it is important to note that derivative contracts are used for speculating 
purposes as well as hedging against risk. Derivative transactions, because of their complex and 
obscure nature, attract attention from regulators, accounting standard setters and researchers. 
(Naor, 2006). 
In most cases, large firms are the predominant users of derivatives (Mian, 1996). In 1996, 
Mian proved that firm size was positively correlated to derivative use (as firm size increased, so 
did the use of derivatives). In a survey of the Wharton School, Bodnar and Günther found that 
German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using 
derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. However, the financial markets are international and 
foreign currency derivative hedging can affect domestic firms that trade in these markets (Bodnar, 
& Gebhardt, 1998). In this survey, almost half of the respondents considered stable cash flows 
and earnings stability their primary objective.  
In 2005, McKee argued the reduction of earnings volatility may be the goal of many 
firms and minimized the need for total earnings volatility elimination (McKee, 2005). It is 
conceivable that if derivatives can reduce risk, they are also useful in stabilizing earnings trends. 
For example, if a firm is faced with a variable-interest rate on a debt obligation, and a financial 
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manager believes that interest rates will increase in the next quarter, the manager may consider 
hedging this interest rate with an interest rate swap. To hedge the floating rate exposures, the 
manager can enter into a pay-fixed receive-variable interest rate swap, which will stabilize 
reported earnings simply by exercising a hedging derivative (Singh, 2004). Guay conducted a 
study to evaluate the role of derivatives in firms initiating derivatives use. The results are 
consistent with firms using derivatives to hedge (Guay, 1999), and minimize entity risk.  
Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998), explored selective hedging in their study conducted in 
1998. In this study, Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston found 66 percent of the firms in their sample 
timed their interest rate hedges based on their perception of anticipated interest rate volatility in 
the market (Bodnar, & Gebhardt, 1998).  
Based on McKee’s study conducted in 2005, derivatives offer many opportunities to 
manage earnings because firms are free to exercise discretion in the timing of derivative contracts 
(McKee, 2005). As explained above, the timing of a derivative option contract provides an 
opportunity to manage earnings by timing when a contract that will be exercised as well as 
reducing the risk being hedged or un-hedged. Barton (2001) claimed that firms with recorded 
derivative use were more likely to engage in earnings management than companies without 
reported derivative use (p.24).  
While all these papers provide evidence that the use of derivatives is consistent with 
incentives to hedge a firm against associated risk (Bodnar, et.al., 1998), none of these papers 
directly test whether the use of derivatives reduces earnings volatilities resulting in smoother 
earnings. 
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Derivatives and SFAS No.133 Accounting Discretion 
To prove that derivative use captures basic attributes of hedging, Barton (2001) used the 
correlation between the notional amount and the hedge ratios. He also provided evidence that 
suggested that derivative users tend to have less volatile operating cash flows and total accruals 
than nonusers (Barton, 2001). In 2002, Pincus and Rajgopal concluded that managers of oil and 
gas producing firms first established the extent to which they would use derivatives to hedge 
commodity volatility and then managed earnings volatility by trading off discretionary accruals 
and hedging to smooth earnings (Pincus, & Rajgopal, 2002). While their results showed no 
evidence that the extent of hedging was a significant determinant of hedging, they did find 
however that the extent of hedging was a considerable building block for earnings management 
strategies.  
Nissim and Penman (2003) proved that firm value was positively related to earnings and 
inversely related to interest rates. According to Stulz (1996), a derivative is the most powerful 
tool in reducing interest costs (Nissim, & Penman, 2003). Stulz pointed out that hedging 
increased firm value only if managers believed they had informational advantages. Stulz (1996) 
embraced behavioral finance in his conclusions—an area still in its infancy phase of academic 
finance.     
Earnings Management with Derivative Hedging 
Derivative hedging involves taking a financial position that results in a gain or a loss to 
offset a loss or gain in the underlying asset or liability being hedged (Stulz, 2003). Hedging will 
reduce the volatility of a firm's earnings by trading off potential gains against potential losses. 
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Therefore, it can be argued that derivatives provide an effective and efficient means to reduce 
cash flow and earnings volatility (Stulz, 2003). 
Hedging is a common practice among public firms. Huang, Ryan and Wiggins contend 
managers are risk averse. In their study of the use of nonlinear derivatives (options), they found 
nonlinear cash flow characteristics in investment opportunity, debt, and executive compensation 
all relate positively to nonlinear derivative usage (Huang, Ryan, & Wiggins, 2007). It is logical 
therefore, that the reduction in risk exposure would be desirable by all risk-averse stakeholders. In 
2009, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson conducted a study to examine the use of credit derivatives 
by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. 
They found that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the 
amount of loans on their books. Their research confirmed only 23 large banks out of 395 used 
credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than 
for hedging of loans. They contend the findings suggest that the use of credit derivatives by banks 
to hedge loans is limited by the adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the 
inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. This study raises 
important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives provides financial 
stability in the banking industry. (Minton, Stulz, & Williamson, 2009)  
Hedging the fair value of assets and liabilities is a financially fundamental process that 
one could define as simple in application (Emery, Douglas, & Finnerty, 1997). The assumptions 
used in the models created for the fair value calculations introduce complexity. The complexity in 
derivative hedging models begin with the imbedded assumptions that (a) markets are efficient, (b) 
behavioral financial factors are irrelevant, (c) asset returns are normally distributed random 
variables, (d) volatility can be stabilized, (e) prices follow a normal distribution, (f) investors are 
risk averse (g) return on investment is directly related to risk exposure, and (h) transaction costs 
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are excluded (Guay, 1999). Hedging cash flows is more difficult to accomplish because the cash 
flow and the hedging derivatives are changing at different rates (Myers, & Skinner, 1999). In 
addition, most derivative contracts have no market reference because they are not actively traded 
in the secondary market and as a result, the hedge is not always completely effective.  
It is important to note, derivatives and other innovative financial maneuvering serve 
legitimate business and investment objectives (Guay, 1999). The ability to shift, replace, or 
transfer risks with financial derivatives is an essential tool for today’s businesses. However, 
derivatives also present a number of serious challenges for the entire financial reporting system 
regardless of industry sector (Sheedy, 1997). Although derivatives have been used for many 
years, the way in which they are used today is new; complex; and somewhat vague in their 
application (Guay, 1999). As a result, detecting earnings management through the manipulation 
of derivatives is difficult to identify. (McKee, 2005). Tucker (2006) contends exercising a 
hedging derivative targeted at interest rate risk, a firm can minimize the exposure to interest rate 
volatility and decrease the interest rate cost while decreasing its cash flow (by capturing the cost 
associated with exercising the hedging derivative).   
By timing the utilization of hedging derivatives, a firm can alter their current earnings 
(Tucker, & Zarowin, 2006). For example, suppose managers of a firm believe additional earnings 
are needed on the financials to meet pre-determined targets. Under this scenario, a manager can 
terminate a hedging derivative that carries an unrealized gain. Then, according to the GAAP 
rules, the unrealized gain will be added to current earnings immediately--thus increase earnings. 
On the other hand, suppose the manager believes it is necessary to reduce earnings on reported 
financials, under this scenario a manager can terminate a hedging derivative that carries an 
unrealized loss. Terminating a financial derivative can result in a stop of payment streams under 
the derivative contract, thus reducing reported earnings (Tucker, & Zarowin, 2006). 
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Disclosure Quality of Derivative Reporting 
The transparency in financial reporting and the disclosure quality of derivative hedging is 
a major concern for stakeholders and regulators. Since 1990, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) has issued seven accounting pronouncements pertaining to financial instruments. 
The approach employed by FASB has been to issue addendums to existing regulation and piece 
together a complete reporting regulation package (Blankey, & Schroeder, 2000). The 
development of the regulation for derivative instruments under SFAS No. 133 has taken the 
FASB 10 years to complete. Prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 133, the FASB issued SFAS No. 
119 Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. 
The intent of SFAS No. 119 is to improve the previous standards. In 2000, the FASB issued 
SFAS No. 138 as an amendment to SFAS No. 133 and is to be used when certain technical 
changes from SFAS No. 133 are introduced (Tombley, 2003). Prior studies have been conducted 
to investigate disclosure quality associated with derivative hedging such as Sengupta in 1998, 
Blankey & Schroeder in 2000, and Riahi-Belkaouhi in 2001. Prior studies indicate a correlation 
exists between disclosure quality and firm specific characteristics.  
In a study conducted by Ashmed and Courtis, an association between quality disclosure 
in financial reporting and firm specific characteristics has been to explanatory variables from the 
research on agency costs, political costs, corporate governance and information asymmetry 
(Ahmed, & Courtis, 1999). Lobo and Zhou examined the relationship between earnings 
management and disclosure quality in 2001. This evaluation is focused on identifying the 
relationship between (a) information asymmetry and disclosure quality and (b) earnings 
management and information asymmetry (Lobo, & Zhou, 2001).   
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Malone, Fries, and Jones examined the association between the extent of corporate 
disclosure with firm specific characteristics within the oil and gas industry. In this study, a 
weighted disclosure index is created by referencing industry analysts’ reports for the associated 
weights (Malone, Fries, & Jones, 1993). The analysts were asked to weight 129 factors according 
to the relative importance of each factor in the overall investment decision. The total actual scores 
of the index were reported as a percentage of total possible scores. The findings suggest firms 
listed on major stock exchanges with high debt-to-equity ratios report more financial information 
if they have a larger number of shareholders. 
CHAPTER 3: 
RESEARCH METHOD 
In this chapter, the research design and approach are explained and the setting and sample 
is provided. The treatment used to evaluate the five research questions is described and the data 
collection and analysis is defined. The measures taken for the protection of participants’ rights are 
summarized and the chapter ends with a summary of the topics explained. 
The focus of this study is on earnings management through the utilization of derivative 
hedges and accounting treatment of operational activities of a firm in the high technology 
industry segment. The main question is whether the accounting methodology affects the firm’s 
ability to smooth earnings and if earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals 
has decreased after the issuance of SOX. The quality of disclosure and financial transparency in 
reporting of derivative hedging is addressed by the creation of a disclosure quality index to 
investigate transparency in derivative reporting before and after SFAS No. 133.  
The purpose of the analysis in the accounting treatment of operational activities is to 
evaluate the differences between the properties of accrual earnings and cash earnings in such a 
way as to clarify the different ways in which the accounting treatment of operational activities 
may account for any differences in earnings smoothing. In much of the literature on earnings 
smoothing, it is assumed that accruals are used to manage earnings (Bartov, et. al., 2001). 
However, Nissim and Penman (2003) claimed that after the implementation of SOX, accrual 
models have become ineffective in the detection of earnings smoothing. As Cohen, Dey, and Lys 
(2005) contend, firms use actual transactions rather than accruals in earnings smoothing.  
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Research Design and Approach 
The high tech industry segment is selected for this study to maximize the opportunity to 
investigate firms engaged in income conservatism, since these types of firms confront greater 
risks of shareholder litigation than other industries (Lobo, Zhou, 2006). High tech industry 
companies are also affected to a greater degree by conservative accounting standards on research 
and development costs (Uday, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004). Conservatism defined as the higher 
verification standard applied to favorable information that results in lower cumulative earnings 
and net assets (Watts, 2003). The presence of income conservatism is materialized in significantly 
higher proportions of losses and lower average profitability levels for technology firms relative to 
non-technology firms (Kwon, Yin, & Han, 2006). These differences arise primarily from 
differences in operating cash flow levels attributable to R&D expenses. Technology firms also 
show evidence of more negative non-operating accruals (Uday, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004).  
The data mining process included online data retrieval from the published financial 
reports of high technology firms for the years 1997 – 2007. The Mergent database was used to 
extract data files for each company randomly selected for the sample. Only U.S. firms were 
included in the study and all dollar values were converted into millions for consistency in 
comparison. The total cash earnings and the total net accruals were determined with adjustments 
to the raw reported financial statements explained in chapter 1 (Anderson, Caldwell, & Needles, 
1994). Data was collected, descriptive statistics are explained and graphical depictions of total 
cash earnings, and total net accruals are provided. An aggregate t test of all years ranging from 
1997 to 2007 is conducted to test the difference in means between total cash earnings and total 
net accruals.  
The modified Jones model is referenced to separate discretionary accruals from non-
discretionary accruals. The process includes the implementation of a linear regression model 
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where the independent variables are identified with a proxy for non-discretionary accruals. The 
proxy is created by categorizing total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. 
The non-discretionary component reflects business conditions (such as firm growth and length of 
the operating cycle) that create and destroy accruals, while the discretionary component 
highlights management choices (Jones, 1991). After the cross-sectional discretionary accruals are 
identified for all firms for the years 1997 – 2007, a test of proportion means is conducted using a 
binomial distribution to test the proportion of discretionary accruals in 2000 with discretionary 
accruals in 2005. The intent of this investigation is to evaluate the proportion of discretionary 
accrual activities before and after SOX implementation (SOX was implemented in 2002).  
The modified Jones model is employed by regressing accrual data from many firms in the 
same industry for a single time period (cross-sectional) or by regressing accrual data from the 
same firm across several time periods (time-series). There are disadvantages to both methods but 
the cross-sectional analysis is considered a better method for the following technical reasons:  
1. Time-series analysis may not have enough observations in the estimation period to 
obtain reliable parameter estimates for a linear regression. 
2. The coefficient estimates on Sales and GPPE may not be stationary over time. 
3. The self-reversing property of accruals may result in serially correlated residuals. 
Since the coefficient estimates on the change in sales and gross property plant and 
equipment are not stationary over time, it is impossible to make valid statistical inferences from 
the linear regression results obtained with time-series analysis (Nissim, & Penman, 2003). 
Because making valid statistical inferences is paramount in this study, the cross-sectional 
approach is used.  
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Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The cross-sectional model used in this evaluation requires a two-stage process for 
calculations. To accomplish this, the results from the first part of the analysis are used in the next 
stage of analysis to reach the needed estimate (Peasnell, & Pope, 2000). To estimate the non-
discretionary accrual amounts, firm-specific amounts for each independent variable are used for a 
particular period across several different firms. In essence, each data item [(TNA), (ATA), ( 
Sales – Rec), and (GPPE)] is coming from the same period with the next data set originating 
from a different firm. The data set of 30 different firms with accounting data for the year ending 
2007 yields one estimated regression equation. Since the period range in this study is from 1997 
to 2007, ten regression equations are estimated for the 30 firms—one for each fiscal year. 
The difference in the rate of change in total cash earnings with derivative hedging and the 
rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative hedging is investigated with an F test. 
Two groups are created for this analysis. One group includes the calculated rate of change of total 
cash earnings of firms who did not report the use of derivative hedging during the period 1997 to 
2007 and the other group includes the calculated rate of change in total cash earnings of firms 
who did report the use of derivative hedging during the period 1997 to 2007. The rate of change 
for all firms is aggregated across 10 years and the F test is used to investigate the variances in the 
rate of change of both groups. The difference in the quality of derivative reporting of firms who 
reported the use of derivative hedging is evaluated by aggregating un-weighted index scores of 
quality disclosure for the periods 1997 to 2007. All companies who reported the use of derivative 
hedging in their annual reports are evaluated. The focus of this test is on the quality of financial 
statements and annual reports and is based on accounting policy information, anticipated hedging 
activities, risk assessment, and net fair value information. All firms who reported the use of 
derivative hedging are evaluated in these 4 areas of reporting transparency. Each area of 
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transparency contains a select number of questions (policy information = 4 questions; anticipated 
hedging activities = 5 questions; risk assessment = 3 questions; and net fair value = 7 questions). 
Each firm is scored a 1 for reporting and a 0 if otherwise. Then all scores are summed and divided 
by the possible score. For example, the risk area includes 3 questions so a firm could score a 3 if 
they reported in each area and in which case, 3 would be divided by the 3 (possible score) 
resulting in a total score of 1. The objective is to yield one quality disclosure score for all firms. 
After descriptive depictions of each individual quality factor is presented for all derivative 
hedging firms, each individual firm score is summed and divided by the possible score of 4  
(policy information, anticipated hedging activities, risk assessment and net fair value). For 
example if a firm scored a 3 out of the possible 4 in the transparency test (Risk, Accounting, 
Hedging, and Fair Value) then the 3 is divided by 4 (3/4 = .75) resulting in a .75 overall quality 
disclosure score ( referenced as QDI score from this point on). The final QDI scores of all firms 
who reported derivative hedging in 1998 and 2002 is investigated with a population proportion 
test. The intent is to evaluate the proportion of QDI scores of firms who reported the use of 
derivative hedging before and after the implementation of SFAS No. 133. 
Setting and Sample 
In the later half of 2001, the U.S. financial market experienced crashes and frauds of 
Enron, WorldCom and other companies that required the U.S. Congress to regulate corporate 
governance. These financial crises were addressed with the Congressional issuance of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which attempted to restore confidence in the securities markets 
(Ribstein, 2002). A study of the mitigating effects of the SOX Act conducted by Aono and Guan 
(2007) found earnings manipulative behavior to round earnings result in an upward bias. Early 
findings are inconclusive on the success of the Act (Zhou, 2007). Cohen, Dey and Lys (2004) 
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asserted firms engage in less earnings management post-SOX, but Lobo and Zhou (2006) find 
that firms report earnings more conservatively. Reporting more conservatively could be 
consistent with greater earnings management Cohen, Dey, & Lys, (2004). In the high tech 
industry, companies are affected to a significant degree by conservative accounting standards 
such as SFAS 2 on R&D costs (Uday, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004).  
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 passed in 1998, established 
accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments and hedging activities (Wallison, & 
Hassett, 2004). The decision to use derivatives for hedging is contigent on existing exposure 
factors (i.e. foreign sales and foreign trade) and on variables associated with theories of optimal 
hedging (i.e., size and R&D expenditures). In addition, the level of derivatives used depends only 
on a firm's exposure through foreign sales and trade (Allayannis, & Ofek, 1997). Empirical 
evidence suggests that managers are averse to reporting earnings volatility introduced by SFAS 
133 (Barton, 2001). From these findings, it is evident that firms seeking to smooth earnings 
volatility have been using discretionary accruals and or derivative hedging (Barnes, 2003). Data 
were randomly drawn from listings of all U.S. companies traded on U.S. markets. The high 
technology industry segment is the target of this study due to income conservatism 
characteristics. The high technology segment drawn for the sample is defined by SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) codes which refer to a four-digit number assigned to U.S. industries and 
their products. The specific SIC codes used in this analysis can be found in Table 6 in Appendix 
A. All firms classified by these SIC codes are drawn and thirty companies are randomly drawn 
from to form the sample. The simple random sample is generated by listing all firms in the 
sample in Microsoft Excel and using the rand function to generate 30 random companies. If a 
company in the sample has not reported financials for the entire period under review (1997 – 
2007) they are dropped from the sample and another firm from the population described by SIC 
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code is randomly selected to yield 30 companies in the sample. Annually reported data is used for 
all calculations and dollar values of all firms are translated into millions. The significance level 
for all tests in this study is set to .05. 
The sample size is 30 the Type I and Type II errors are analyzed to ensure sampling error 
is not introduced in this study as a result of a small sample size. A sample size of 30 is selected 
due to the arduous research involved in the analysis of these firms for the period 1997 through 
2007. Figure 1 in Appendix B reports the Type I and Type II errors.  
  The observed effect size (Cohen's d) defined as the difference between two means 
divided by a standard deviation for the data is used to measures the observed difference and is 
also used to analyze the meaning of the data (the larger the effect, the more meaningful). The d is 
defined as the difference between two means divided by the pooled standard deviation for those 
means. In Figure 1, the Type I error reflects the level of significance for testing. In this analysis, 
all tests are evaluated with a level of significance of .05. The Type II errors are measured by beta. 
The Type II errors are all below the standard .20 (Cohen, 1992). The measured effects are 
medium to large. The Type I and Type II errors for the linear regression analysis are presented in 
Figure 2 within Appendix B: 
 The Type II errors are low and the thresholds for the Cohen’s d are large for all periods. 
The post-hoc statistical power of the regression models are strong. The R2 which measures the 
model are all high (68% or higher) indicating the model effectively fits the data. 
Treatment 
Research question 1 is measured by using an aggregate approach to calculate the total 
cash earnings and the total net accruals of all the firms in the sample. The total net accruals are 
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calculated to investigate the difference in earnings volatility between total net accruals and total 
cash earnings, the total cash earnings is calculated as:  
TCE = ( C – CI – STK + EI)       (7) 
Where: TCE = total cash earnings  
C = change in cash 
CI = cash dividends 
STK = stock repurchases 
EI = equity issuance 
The total net accruals are calculated:  
TNA = NI – C – CI – STK + EI       (8) 
Where: TNA = total net accruals  
NI = net income  
C = change in cash 
 CI = cash dividends 
 STK = stock repurchases  
 EI = equity issuance 
Research Question 1 
An aggregate t test of all years ranging from 1997 to 2007 is conducted to test the 
difference in means between total cash earnings and total net accruals. The objective is to 
investigate the difference in the means of reported numbers in total net accruals and total cash 
earnings. In theory, total cash earnings minus total net accruals should equal zero (Anderson, 
Caldwell, & Needles, 1994). However, accruals are used to reduce timing and mismatching 
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problems in underlying cash flows (Bartov, et.al., 2001). Accruals therefore accomplish this 
benefit at the cost of making assumptions and estimates about future cash flows, (Collins, & 
Hribar, 2000) this implies that accruals include errors of estimation or noise. Estimation noise 
inherent in accruals reduces the beneficial role of accruals and therefore total accruals are 
expected to be greater than total cash earnings. For a comprehensive examination, a two-way 
hypothesis is tested. The hypothesis is that the total accruals activity equals the total discretionary 
accrual activity. The stated hypothesis assumes unequal variances and is defined as: 
H0: 1 = 2
H1: 1 2
Where: 1 = total cash earnings  
2 = total net accruals  
Research Question 2 
Research question 2 is investigated by determining the discretionary accrual amount of 
each firm using the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991). Under the modified Jones model, the 
independent variables are used as a proxy for activities that reflect a relationship to non-
discretionary accruals. The independent variables (IV) reflect normal accruals driven by sales, 
plant property and equipment, expected sales growth, and current operating performance (Jones, 
1991). The total net accruals (TNA) calculation is used for a linear regression analysis and is set 
as the dependent variable (DV). The independent variables are (a) net income, (b) change in cash, 
(c) cash dividends, (d) stock repurchases, and (e) equity issuance. Once 0, 1, 2 and 3 are 
estimated for the cross-section of firms for all the periods (calculated by running a linear 
regression equation), the cross-sectional coefficients along with the firm specific data for each of 
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the identified independent variables are used to estimate the individual firm's non-discretionary 
accruals for the period. The non-discretionary accruals is estimated by: 
NDA =  0 +  1(ATA) +  2( Sales – Rec) +  3(GPPE) +     (9) 
Where: NDA= non discretionary accruals  
ATA = Average total assets  
Sales = Change in sales  
Rec= Change in accounts receivable  
GPPE = Gross PP&E 
The average total assets calculated for each firm in the sample and derived from the 
balance sheets of all firms. The average total assets calculated as, average total assets = (prior 
years total assets) + (current years total assets / number of periods). The total discretionary 
accruals are the difference between the individual firm's total net accruals (TNA) and its 
estimated total non-discretionary accrual amount, calculated as TDA = TNA – NDA.  
Research Question 3 
A test of population proportions is conducted to investigate the proportional differences 
of discretionary accrual usage in 2000 with discretionary accruals usage in 2005 (before and after 
SOX implementation). The hypothesis is that the proportion of discretionary accruals in 2000 is 
equal to the proportion of discretionary accruals in 2005. The hypothesis is stated as: 
H0: p1 = p2  
H1: p1 p2
Where: p1= number of firms who reported DA that represented over 50% of TNA in 2000 
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p2 = number of firms who reported DA that represented over 50% or more of 
TNA 2005 
Research Question 4 
Research question 4 is analyzed by aggregating the calculated rate of change in total cash 
earnings of all firms. Then two groups are created, one group for derivative hedging firms and the 
other for non-derivative hedging firms. An F test is used to investigate the variances in the rate of 
change in total cash earnings of firms without derivative hedging and the rate of change in total 









Where:  2/1 = rate of change in TCE without derivative hedging 
 2/2 = rate of change in TCE with derivative hedging 
Research Question 5 
Research question 5 is analyzed by referencing an un-weighted quality disclosure index 
for financial reporting and testing the population proportions QDI scores of firms before and after 
SFAS No. 133. All companies who reported the use of derivative hedging in their annual reports 
are evaluated. The financial statements and annual reports are analyzed in terms of the accounting 
policy information, anticipated hedging activities, risk assessment, and net fair value information. 
(Myers, James, Myers, & Omer, 2003) each area of transparency has a select number of 
questions.  
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Policy Information Questions 
1. Are the accounting policies and the method adopted explained in the 
financial statements or annual reports? 
2. Are the uncertainties of future cash flows explained? 
3. Are the objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments 
explained? 
4. Are the objectives for holding or issuing derivative financial instruments 
explained? 
Figure 3. This figure shoes the index scoring for policy information. All firms are assigned a “1” 
for providing the data in their financial statements or annual reports and a “0” if otherwise. The 
depth of policy information reported is not included in the scoring index. This scoring is only 
concerned with whether the firm reported this information or not.  
Hedges of Anticipated Transactions 
1. Is a description of the anticipated hedging transaction provided? 
2. Is a description of the period until the hedge is expected to occur reported 
in the financial statements or annual reports? 
3. Is a description of the hedging instrument reported? 
4. Is the amount of any deferred or un-recognized gain or loss reported? 
5. Is the expected timing of recognition as revenue or expense reported? 
Figure 4. This figure shoes the index scoring for hedges of anticipated transactions. All firms are 
assigned a “1” for providing the data in their financial statements or annual reports and a “0” if 
otherwise. The depth of anticipated hedging transaction information reported is not included in 




1. Are the contractual re-pricing or maturity dates for interest rate risk 
reported? 
2. Are the effective interest rates or weighted averages reported? 
3. Are the maximum amounts of credit risk exposure at the reporting date 
provided? 
Figure 5. This figure shows the index scoring for risk information. All firms are assigned a “1” 
for providing the data in their financial statements or annual reports and a “0” if otherwise. The 
depth of risk reported information is not included in the scoring index. This scoring is only 
concerned with whether the firm reported this information or not. 
Net Fair Value Information 
1. Are the aggregate net fair values of the reporting date provided? 
2. Does the reporting show separately in aggregate net fair value of those 
financial assets or financial liabilities, which are not readily traded on 
organized markets? 
3. Is the method used for determining net fair value explained? 
4. Are any significant assumptions made in the determination of net fair value 
provided? 
5. Is the carrying amount and the net fair value of either the individual asset or 
appropriate groupings of those individual assets reported? 
6. Are the reasons for not reducing the carrying amount provided? 
7. Is the nature of the evidence that provides the basis for management’s 
belief that the carrying amount will be recovered explained? 
Figure 6. This figure shows the index scoring for net fair value.  All firms are assigned a “1” for 
providing the data in their financial statements or annual reports and a “0” if otherwise. The depth 
of net fair value information reported is not included in the scoring index. This scoring is only 
concerned with whether the firm reported this information or not. 
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1 or 0 Score 1 or 0 Score 1 or 0 Score 1 or 0 Score 4 Scores 
Sum of Scores 
divided by 
possible scores 
Figure 7. This figure shows the scoring for QDI scores. All firms are assigned a “1” for providing 
the data in their financial statements or annual reports and a “0” if otherwise. The depth of 
reported information in each disclosure quality category is not included in the scoring index. This 
disclosure quality index is only concerned with whether the firm reported this information or not. 
After each firm is scored a 1 for reporting and a 0 if otherwise, all scores are summed and 
divided by the possible score (for example the Risk area includes 3 questions so a firm could 
score a 3 if they reported in each area so if they scored a 3 then the 3 would be divided by the 3 
(possible score) resulting in a 1). Under this scoring, all reporting is ranked and ranges from 0 to 
1 with 0 equal to poor quality disclosure in financial reporting and 1 equal to superior quality 
disclosure in financial reporting. Only 1 score of disclosure quality is needed to test the 
population proportion so the measure is used again by summing up all final scores for each area 
of transparency and dividing by the possible score. Then the population proportion of the final 
quality disclosure scores of all firms who reported derivative hedging in 1998 and 2002 are 
evaluated. The hypothesis is that the proportion of the QDI scores above 80% in 1998 is greater 
than the proportion of the QDI scores above 80% in 2002. The hypothesis is stated as: 
H0: p1 p2
H1: p1 < p2
Where: p1= number of firms with QDI scores above 80% in 1998 
p2 = number of firms with QDI scores above 80% in 2002 
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Instrumentation and Materials 
In research question 1, an aggregate t test of all years ranging from 1997 to 2007 is 
conducted to test the difference in means between total cash earnings and total net accruals. The 
objective is to investigate the difference in the means of total net accruals and total cash earnings 
for all years. The hypothesis is that the means of accounting accruals is equal to the means of 
cash earnings for all firms. This is a comparative research question and is investigated with 
inferential statistics. This test is a parametric test and the data is ratio scaled. 
In research question 2 is a correlational evaluation and is conducted to generate a more 
robust framework of analysis for total accruals. This is a comparative study that includes 
correlational analysis of, discretionary accruals that are segmented away from non-discretionary 
accruals (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). To accomplish this separation, the modified Jones 
model introduced in 1991 is used. The modified Jones model is a multiple linear regression model 
that regresses the total net accruals to estimate the coefficients for discretionary accruals once a 
cross-sectional or a time-series approach has been established (Hribar, & Collings, 2002; Kothari, 
Leone, & Wasley, 2005, & Tucker, & Zarowin, 2006). This is a correlational analysis and is a 
descriptive analysis. The data is ratio scaled. This is a parametric analysis that takes the form of a 
linear multiple regressions. In this analysis, there are 4 independent variables that are continuous 
(average total assets, change in sales, change in accounts receivable, gross plant property and 
equipment), and one dependent variable (TNA) that lie on a continuum. Each independent 
variable is obtained from the published annual financial statements of each firm in the sample. 
The total net accrual (TNA) is calculated from the total net accruals equation while NDA is 
determined with the regression of total net accruals. This regression correlational analysis is used 
to determine the discretionary component of total accruals.  
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Research question 3 is a comparative test conducted to evaluate the proportion of 
discretionary accruals used before and after the issuance of SOX. Once the discretionary 
components are determined for each firm in the sample for all periods 1997 – 2007 in research 
question 2, a test of population proportions is conducted to investigate the proportion of 
discretionary accruals utilized before and after the implementation of the SOX Act. This is a 
parametric test and the data used in this investigation is ratio scaled. The hypothesis is that the 
proportion of discretionary accruals is less before the issuance of SOX than it is after.   
Research question 4 is a comparative test to investigate the rate of change in total cash 
earnings with derivative hedging and the rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative 
hedging. This F test is a parametric test and the data in is ratio scaled. In this test, the hypothesis 
is that the rate of change in total cash earnings of firms with derivative use is be less volatile than 
the rate of change in total cash earnings of firms without derivative use. The focus of this test is 
on the volatility of earnings and an F test for equality of two population variances is performed to 
determine if the standard deviations of two populations are equal (in this case, the rate of change 
in total cash earnings with derivative hedging and the rate of change in total cash earnings 
without derivative hedging).  
Research question 5 is a comparative research question and is addressed with inferential 
statistics. The data is ordinal scaled. An un-weighted quality disclosure index is created to 
evaluate firms who reported the use of derivative hedging in four categories of financial 
transparency (Risk, Hedging, Fair Value, and Accounting). Each area of transparency has a select 
number of questions and each firm is scored a 1 for reporting and a 0 if otherwise. Although it 
seems as though nominal data is used, these scores are used to rank the quality of disclosure (0 to 
1) and are ordinal in nature. A test of population proportions is then conducted to investigate the 
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proportional differences between quality disclosure in financial reporting before and after the 
implementation of SFAS No. 133. This population proportion test is a parametric statistical test.  
Measures Taken for the Protection of Participants’ Rights 
The data used in this investigation is derived from publically published financial reports 
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. All data is pulled by SIC code, saved to a 
password protected file, and ordered by company ticker code number. No human subjects were 
used in this research study.  
Summary 
The data used in this research is obtained from public financial data and is accessed using 
Mergent Online database. The financial statements and annual reports of the firms in the sample 
are analyzed to determine the difference in means of total cash earnings and total net accruals. 
The financial statements include, (a) balance sheets, (b) income statements, (c) statements of cash 
flows, (d) statements of retained earnings and (e) annual reports. Discretionary accruals are 
separated from total accruals for all years 1997 – 2007 using a cross-sectional modified Jones 
model. The proportions of discretionary accrual usage are investigated with a test of population 
proportions before and after the issuance of the SOX Act. The rate of change in total cash 
earnings with derivative hedging is tested against the rate of change in total cash earnings without 
derivative hedging using an F test to investigate the differences in variances. The quality of 
disclosed derivative hedging is analyzed by an un-weighted quality transparency index. The 
quality of disclosure in derivative hedging is then tested with a population proportion test to 




The findings of the evaluations are provided in this section. The statistical test summaries 
are included in the Appendix and the interpretations of findings and recommendations are 
provided in chapter 5. The impact to positive social change in the area of financial management is 
explained in chapter 5. 
The economic crisis that began during the late 20th century resulted in dramatic losses in 
equity values within international financial markets. Between June 2007 and November 2008, 
Americans lost more than one quarter of their net worth. By early November 2008, the S&P 500 
was down 45 percent from its 2007 high. Housing prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, 
with futures markets signaling a 30-35% potential drop. Total home equity in the United States, 
which was valued at $13 trillion at its peak in 2006, had dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008, and 
was still falling in late 2008. Total retirement assets, Americans' second-largest household asset, 
dropped by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same 
period, savings and investment assets (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 trillion and 
pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses total $8.3 trillion (Minton, Stulz, & 
Williamson, 2009). The crisis of the financial system has resulted in a crisis in the entire 
economical system (Minton, Stulz, & Williamson, 2009). It has been argued  by Crutchley, 
Jensen, and Marshal (2007) that this financial anomaly is a full market correction directly 
attributable to the lack of international regulation and consistency in domestic regulation 
standards within financial markets.  
One of the most significant factors in financial markets that have lead to this economic 
convergence is rooted in the lack of reporting requirements for derivative hedging and 
speculating (Huddart & Louis, 2008). Derivatives are off the balance sheet items and are not 
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reported in the same manner as other assets and liabilities (Barton, & Simko, 2002). In addition, 
these financial instruments have no true value reference and do not accurately reflect market 
value (Hentschel & Kothari, 1999). Therefore, any unreported gains or losses not reflected in 
published financial statements or annual reports cannot be captured with the use of the modified 
Jones model or the quality disclosure index are excluded from this study. In this chapter, the 
results of the quantitative analysis are reported. The instrumentation, data preparation, statistical 
analysis, and summary of the findings are provided in this section. 
Problems Encountered 
Only firms that published complete financial information for the entire period 1997 
through 2007 are included. Two firms (ticker codes MXIM and JDSU) are excluded from the 
sample because they do not possess financial information for the entire period under review. Two 
firms (ticker codes LSCC and CTXS) are randomly drawn from the population to yield a sample 
of 30 firms.  
Quantitative Data Analysis 
As described in chapter 3, this study is designed to investigate the impact of the 
accounting treatment on earnings smoothing and to evaluate the impact of derivative hedging on 
real cash earnings. The transparency of derivative reporting has also been investigated to explore 
the disclosure quality of derivative hedging. There is an established, literature-based need for 
understanding in the presence of regulation, earnings smoothing through the use of discretionary 
accruals and derivative hedging. The theoretical foundations of this study employed a systematic, 
analysis-based study, utilizing the modified Jones model and a quality disclosure index 
(Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, Magnan, & Gray-Angers, 2006), similar to the index used by 
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Lapointe –Antunes to measure the relationship between voluntary disclosure, earnings smoothing, 
and the value-relevance of earnings.  
Total Cash Earnings and Total Net Accruals 
Research question 1 is a comparative investigation conducted to addresses the impact of 
accounting treatment on reported earnings. Generally speaking, total cash earnings should equal 
total net accruals. In empirical data, accruals use estimates to help reduce timing and mismatching 
problems in underlying cash flows. The overall benefit of accruals is achieved at the cost of 
making assumptions and estimates about future cash flows. As a result, accruals possess a 
fundamental estimation error. Since the errors in estimation reduce the beneficial role of accruals, 
they should be more volatile than real earnings. To examine this relationship, total cash earnings 
and total cash accruals are calculated for all firms using an aggregate testing approach for periods 
1997 to 2007. The statements of cash flows of the firms are referenced to calculate the total cash 
earnings for all the firms in the sample for years 1997 through 2007 using the following formula:  
            
TCE =  Cash + Cash Dividends + Stock Repurchases – Equity Issuances  (10) 
The total net accruals are calculated for all firms using the following formula: 
             
TNA = Net Income – TCE        (11)
The average total cash earnings are significantly greater than the average total net accruals as 
depicted in Figure 2 located in Appendix C.  
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Figure 8. Average total cash earnings and average total net accruals: 1997 – 2007 
An, aggregate evaluation and t test is conducted for all firms in the sample during periods 
1997 through 2007. The hypothesis:  
H0 : 1 2  
H1 : 1 2  
Where: 1 = average total cash earnings 
2 = average total net accruals 
The test is conducted as a two-way t test. The results of the aggregate t tests for all years 
1997 through 2007 depicted in table 8 provide the aggregate results of the t test. The null 
hypothesis that total cash earnings are equal to total net accruals is rejected and is statistically 
significant for all years. These results are provided in table 8. In addition, a t test for all years 
1997 through 2007 is conducted to test the sensitivity of the aggregate t tests. The result of the 
sensitivity t test for all years is also statistically significant.   
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Table 7 Aggregate t tests Results for Total Cash Earnings and Total Net Accruals 
Aggregate t tests 
Year n df TCE M TCE SD TNA M TNA SD p 
1997 30 58       758      1,789     (273) 532 0.00
1998 30 58       820      1,911     (284) 735 0.01
1999 30 58    1,139      2,550     (315) 1,169 0.01
2000 30 58    1,933      3,522     (575) 1,116 0.00
2001 30 58    1,985      6,063   (1,772) 4,759 0.01
2002 30 58    2,400      7,546   (2,022) 6,084 0.02
2003 30 58    2,896      9,338   (2,123) 7,483 0.03
2004 30 58    3,889    10,567   (2,833) 8,937 0.01
2005 30 58    2,840      5,687   (1,504) 3,183 0.00
2006 30 58    3,443      8,654   (2,120) 6,264 0.01
2007 30 58    3,381      8,084   (2,134) 5,386 0.00
Sensitivity t test   
Year n df TCE M TCE SD TNA M TNA SD p 
1997 - 2007 330 658    2,317      6,659   (1,450)       5,022 0.00
Note. n = number of firms in the sample; df = degrees of freedom; TCE M = total cash earnings 
mean; TCE SD = total cash earnings standard deviation; TNA M = total net accruals mean; TNA 
SD = total net accruals standard deviation; p = associated p value. 
The means for total cash earnings are greater than the means for total net accruals for all 
years 1997 through 2007. The degree of dispersion around the mean, measured by the standard 
deviation is greater for total net accruals than for total cash earnings with the exception of periods 
1997, 1998, and 2000. Full statistical summaries for all aggregate t tests and sensitivity tests are 
provided in Appendix C.    
Research question 2 is a correlational test conducted to addresses the impact of 
discretionary accruals on the accounting treatment on reported earnings. To analyze discretionary 
accruals, non-discretionary accruals are separated from total accruals (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 
2005). The modified Jones model is used to create the dichotomy between discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals. The analysis includes the use of a multiple linear regression model that 
regresses the total net accruals to estimate the coefficients for discretionary accruals (Hribar, & 
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Collings, 2002; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; & Tucker, & Zarowin, 2006). This study uses a 
cross-sectional research approach. Total net accruals (TNA) are calculated from the total net 
accruals equation while NDA is determined with the regression of total net accruals. A regression 
correlational analysis is used to determine the discretionary component of total accruals. Once the 
discretionary components are determined for each firm in the sample for all periods 1997 – 2007, 
a t test is conducted to investigate discretionary usage of firms before and after the issuance of 
SOX.  
Analysis of Discretionary Accruals 
The total net accruals are regressed using the following formula: 
             
NDA = 0 + 1 (ATA) + 2 ( Sales – Rec) + 3 (GPPE) +    (12) 
The resulting coefficients for discretionary accruals identified in table 9, are used to construct the 
estimated regression equations for non-discretionary accruals provided in table 10. For aggregate 
statistical summaries, refer to Appendix D. 
Table 8 Estimated Regression Coefficients
Year Intercept ATA Sales – Rec  GPPE 
1997          13.17             0.15                       (0.15)           (0.08)
1998          92.19             0.12                        0.12            (0.10)
1999        135.45             0.05                       (0.07)            0.16  
2000         (90.85)            0.19                        0.10             0.01  
2001       (761.52)            0.36                       (0.13)           (0.24)
2002       (530.76)            0.47                        0.67            (0.48)
2003       (881.76)            0.34                        4.18            (0.62)
2004    (1,021.52)            0.58                       (0.50)           (0.53)
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2005          77.50             0.20                       (0.32)           (0.11)
2006    (1,226.39)            0.45                       (0.31)           (0.44)
2007        376.67            (1.27)                        3.23            (0.05)
Note. The table shows the regression coefficients for the aggregate non-discretionary accruals for 
periods 1997 through 2007.   
Table 9 Estimated Regression Equations
Year Estimated Regression Equation R2
Adjusted 
R2
1997  = 13.168+ 0.147x - 0.148x - 0.079x 0.82 0.80 
1998  = 92.193 + 0.122x + 0.124x - 0.102x 0.70 0.66 
1999  = 135.452 + 0.045x - 0.066x + 0.161x 0.88 0.87 
2000  = -90.851 + 0.189x + 0.101x + 0.012x 0.83 0.81 
2001  = -761.518 + 0.358x - 0.130x - 0.238x 0.73 0.70 
2002  = -530.757+ 0.472x + 0.674x - 0.483x 0.86 0.84 
2003  = -881.759 + 0.343x + 4.176x - 0.618x 0.86 0.84 
2004  = -1,021.520 + 0.584x - 0.504x - 0.528x 0.91 0.90 
2005  = 77.502 + 0.196x - 0.315x - 0.113x 0.83 0.82 
2006  = -1,226.387 + 0.447x - 0.306x - 0.435x 0.80 0.78 
2007  = 376.669- 1.272x + 3.225x - 0.049x 0.68 0.64 
Note. In a multiple linear regression model, the adjusted R2 measures the proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variable accounted for by the explanatory variables. Unlike r square, 
the adjusted R2 allows for the degrees of freedom associated with the sums of the squares. 
Therefore, even though the residual sum of squares decreases or remains the same as new 
explanatory variables are added, the residual variance does not. The adjusted R2 is generally 
considered a more accurate goodness-of-fit measure than R2; nevertheless, both the R2 and the 
adjusted R2 are reported in this table (Aczel, & Sounderpandian, 2002).  
The adjusted R2 for each year are above .80 with the exception of year 2001 (.70), and 
2007(.64). The adjusted R2 allows for the degrees of freedom associated with the sums of the 
squares. Therefore, even though the residual sum of squares decrease or remain the same as new 
explanatory variables are added, the residual variance does not. For this reason, the adjusted R2 is 
considered an accurate goodness-of-fit measure and this linear regression was used on the 
assumption that the independent variables possess strong explanatory power. These equations 
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were used to predict the aggregate non-discretionary accruals of all firms for periods 1997 – 
2007. The cross-sectional coefficients along with a specific firm's data are used to estimate the 
firm specific non-discretionary accruals for the period 1997 through 2007. 
Discretionary Accruals Activity 
Discretionary accruals have steadily increased from 1997 to 2007. Figure 2 provides a 
visual depiction of discretionary and non-discretionary accrual activities for this period.  
Figure 9. Total accrual activity years: 1997 - 2007 
As illustrated by the histogram of total accruals, the discretionary accruals represent a significant 
portion of total accruals. A breakout of total net accruals is provided in Table 11. For full 
statistical summaries, refer to Appendix D.  
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Table 10 Discretionary Accruals Activity: Years 1997 – 2007
Year TNA NDA DA DA as a % of TNA 
1997 10,044 3,061 6,982 70% 
1998 13,839 5,226 8,613 62% 
1999 18,688 5,879 12,809 69% 
2000 21,951 5,596 16,355 75% 
2001 56,637 15,583 41,054 72% 
2002 69,921 23,074 46,847 67% 
2003 66,384 27,217 39,166 59% 
2004 90,184 33,368 56,816 63% 
2005 51,508 17,488 34,020 66% 
2006 69,750 19,216 50,534 72% 
2007 69,415 26,868 42,547 61% 
Average DA as a % of TNA periods (1997 - 2002) 67% 
Note. TNA = total net accruals; NDA = non-discretionary accruals; DA = discretionary accruals 
SOX Impact on Discretionary Accruals 
Research question 3 is a comparative investigation conducted to evaluate the population 
proportion of discretionary accruals used before and after the issuance of SOX. The average 
percentage of discretionary accruals as a percentage of total accruals for all years 1997 through 
2007 is 67%. The intent of this test is to investigate the proportion of firms who reported 
financials with discretionary accruals representing more than the average discretionary accruals 
as expressed as a percentage of total net accruals for years 1997 through 2007 (67%). This is a 
two-way population proportion test and the hypothesis is: 
 H0: p1 = p2  
H1: p1 p2
Where: p1= number firms with DA representing more than 67% of TNA in 2000 
p2 = number of firms DA representing more than 67% of TNA in 2005 
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The test statistic is 2.43 and the null hypothesis is rejected at p = .014. The results are statistically 
significant. The sample sizes are 30 for both samples. 
Evidence 2000 2005     
Size 30.00 30.00 n   
# of firms w/over 67% of DA in TNA 24.00 15.00 x   
Proportion 0.8000 0.5000 p-hat   
     
Hypothesis Testing       
Hypothesized Difference Zero       
       
  Pooled p-hat 0.6500     
  Test Statistic 2.4360 z    
    At an  of
  Null Hypothesis p-value 5%   
  H0: p1 - p2 = 0 0.0149 Reject   
  H0: p1 - p2 >= 0 0.9926   
  H0: p1 - p2 <= 0 0.0074 Reject   
Figure 10. This figure shows the proportion of discretionary accruals in 2000 and 2005. 
The p-hat is the proportion of individuals having the characteristic when the two samples are 
lumped together. 
In 2000, 80% of firms used discretionary accruals that represented more than 67% of the total net 
accruals. In 2005, the number of firms reduced to 50% of firms who used discretionary accruals 
that represented more than 67% of the total net accruals. The findings suggest the use of accruals 
are increasing but the percentage of discretionary accruals is decreasing.  
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Figure 11. Discretionary Accrual Usage: Year 2000 
Figure 12. Discretionary Accrual Usage: Year 2005 
Discretionary accruals represented 75% of total net accruals in year 2000 and 66% in 2005. The 
use of discretionary accruals has decreased 12% from year 2000 to 2005 for high technology 
firms. 
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Analysis of Derivative Hedging  
Research question 4 is a comparative investigation conducted to analyze the variance of 
the rate of change in total cash earnings of firms who use derivative hedging and compare these 
earnings to firms who do not use derivative hedging. Using an aggregate analysis approach, the  
rate of change in total cash earnings is calculated across 10 years (using the rate of change 
calculation reduces the sample size from 11 to 10) and an F test is conducted to evaluate the rate 
of change in total cash earnings with derivative hedging against the rate of change in total cash 
earnings without derivative hedging. The expectation is that the rate of change in total cash 
earnings with derivative hedging is less than the rate of change in total cash earnings without 




 H1 : 
2/1< 
2
/2   
Where:  2/1 = rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative hedging 
 2/2 = rate of change in total cash earnings with derivative hedging 
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TCE without derivatives TCE with derivatives
Size 10 10 n 
Variance   1,230,487.18    64,274,955.28  s2 
Std Dev         1,109.27            8,017.17  SD
      
Test Statistic 0.0191 F 
df1 9    
df2 9    
At an  of 















2 <= 0 1.00     
Figure 13. This figure shows the statistical summary of the rate of change in derivative hedging. 
The null hypothesis is rejected with a test statistic of .02 and a p = <.000. The degree of 
dispersion as measured by the standard deviation is greater for the rate of change in total cash 
earnings with derivative hedging (SD = 8,017) than it is in the rate of change in total cash 
earnings without derivative hedging (SD = 1,109). For a full statistical summary, refer to 
Appendix E. 
Disclosure Quality Analysis 
Research question 5 is a comparative investigation conducted to analyze the quality of 
disclosed financial statements of firms who reported the use of derivative hedges. All companies 
who reported the use of derivative hedging in their financial statements and annual reports are 
examined. The financial statements and annual reports are measured by the quality of disclosed 
financial information in the areas of accounting policy information, anticipated hedging activities, 
risk assessment, and net fair value information. The firms are evaluated in these four areas of 
77
transparency (Risk, Hedging, Fair Value, and Accounting). Each area of transparency has a select 
number of questions. Each firm is scored a “1” for reporting the information and a “0” if 
otherwise. Then all scores are summed and divided by the possible score (for example the Risk 
area includes 3 questions so a firm could score a 3 if they reported in each area. If they score a 3 
then the 3 would be divided by the 3 (possible score) resulting in a 1). The averages of disclosed 
quality scores have been determined for all firms who reported the use of derivative hedging for 
the periods 1997 through 2007.  













1997 0.81 0.65 0.73 0.63 0.70 
1998 0.77 0.62 0.63 0.56 0.65 
1999 0.81 0.62 0.65 0.59 0.67 
2000 0.80 0.64 0.78 0.63 0.71 
2001 0.88 0.67 0.76 0.69 0.75 
2002 0.90 0.75 0.87 0.71 0.81 
2003 0.88 0.72 0.79 0.68 0.77 
2004 0.90 0.71 0.81 0.68 0.78 
2005 0.93 0.74 0.86 0.67 0.80 
2006 0.94 0.80 0.86 0.71 0.83 
2007 0.90 0.75 0.87 0.71 0.81 
Note. A score of 1 = superior disclosure quality in financial reporting and a score of 0 = poor 
disclosure quality in financial reporting. 
There is some volatility in the QDI scores for firms who reported derivative hedging. 
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Figure 14. This figures shows a graphical depiction of the average policy information score for 
years 1997 – 2007. 
The overall average policy information score for firms who reported the use of derivative  
hedging is increasing from year 2000 to 2006 with a drop in 2007. 
Figure 15. This figure shows the average risk information score for years 1997 - 2007 
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The average risk information score for firms who reported the use of derivative hedging has 
experienced volatility in years 1997 through 2002, however the quality of disclosing risk 
information is steadily improving in years 2003 through 2007.  
Figure 16. This figure shows the average anticipated hedging score for years 1997 - 2007. 
Although there are some drops in the average anticipated hedging score of firms who reported the 
use of derivative hedging, the overall progression of derivative hedge reporting is improving.  
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Figure 17. This figure shows a graphical depiction of the average net fair value scores for years 
1997 – 2007. 
The average net fair value score for firms who reported the use of derivative hedging in years 
1997 – 2007 is steady and is marginally improving. 
Figure 18. This figure shows the graphical depiction of the average QDI scores for years 1997 - 
2007 
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The average QDI score is a composite of all other transparency categories for the annual reported 
years 1998 through 2007. The annual QDI score was below 80% for all firms in the sample for 
seven of the eleven years in the data range. The highest annual QDI score of 83% occurred in 
2006 with a slight drop (down to 81%) in 2007. However, the overall disclosure quality of 
financial reporting is significantly improving. An evaluation of the proportion of QDI scores in 
1998 and 2002 is conducted (before and after SFAS No. 133). The QDI scores of firms who 
reported the use of derivative hedging are presented in figure 8 and 9.  
Figure 19. This figure shows the graphical depiction of the QDI scores for year 1998. 
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Figure 20. This figure shows the graphical depiction of QDI scores for year 2002. 
Of the firms who reported derivative hedging, 67% scored less than 80% on the disclosure quality 
index for the year 1998. However, in 2002 the firms with a QDI score less than 80% reduced to 
48% of total firms in the sample. The mean QDI score in 1998 is 65% while the mean QDI score 
in 2002 is 81%. The proportion of QDI scores above 80% in 1998 is 33% and the proportion of 
QDI scores above 80% in 2002 is 57% with a test statistic of -1.550. The hypothesis is: 
H0: p1 p2
H1: p1 < p2 
Where: p1= number o firms with QDI scores above 80% in 1998 
p2 = number of firms with QDI scores above 80% in 2002 
The null hypothesis that the number of firms with QDI scores above 80% in 1998 is greater than 
the number of firms with QDI scores above 80% in 2002, with a p = .061. The number of firms 
with QDI scores above 80% is greater before the issuance of SFAS than it is after. 
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Evidence 1998 2002 
  Size 21 21 n
# of QDI Scores above 80% 7 12 x 
Proportion 0.33 0.57 p-hat
       
Hypothesis Testing     
Hypothesized Difference Zero     
       
  Pooled p-hat 0.452    
Test Statistic -1.550 z   
    At an  of   
  Null Hypothesis p-value 0.05   
  H0: p1 - p2 = 0 0.121    
  H0: p1 - p2 >= 0 0.061    
  H0: p1 - p2 <= 0 0.939     
Figure 21. This figure shows the summary statistics for the QDI population proportion for years 
1998 – 2002. The p-hat is the proportion of individuals having the characteristic when the two 
samples are lumped together.  
Summary  
Research question 1 is a comparative investigation of total cash earnings and total net 
accruals. Aggregate t tests are conducted to examine the difference in means of total cash 
earnings and total net accruals for the periods 1997 through 2007 with a sensitivity test conducted 
for all periods 1997 – 2007. The results are statistically significant and indicate the means for 
total cash earnings are greater than the means for total net accruals for all years 1997 through 
2007. The degree of dispersion around the mean, measured by the standard deviation is greater 
for total net accruals than for total cash earnings with the exception of periods 1997, 1998, and 
2000. These findings suggest total cash earnings are greater than total net accruals however, total 
net accruals are more volatile reflective of dispersion around the mean.  
Research question 2 is a correlational investigation of the discretionary component of 
total net accruals. The modified Jones model is used to stratify non-discretionary accruals from 
total net accruals and the difference is calculated to yield the total discretionary accrual activity. 
The analysis includes the use of a multiple regression model that is used to regress the total net 
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accruals to estimate the coefficients for discretionary accruals. A cross-sectional approach is used 
to analyze the data. The R2 and adjusted R2 is provided to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
regression model.  
The adjusted R2 for each year are above .80 with the exception of year 2001 (.70), and 
2007(.64). The adjusted R2 allows for the degrees of freedom associated with the sums of the 
squares. Therefore, even though the residual sum of squares decrease or remain the same as new 
explanatory variables are added, the residual variance does not. For this reason, the adjusted R2 is 
considered an accurate goodness-of-fit measure and this linear regression was used on the 
assumption that the independent variables possess strong explanatory power. These equations are 
used to predict the aggregate non-discretionary accruals of all firms for periods 1997 – 2007. The 
cross-sectional coefficients along with a specific firm's data are used to estimate the firm specific 
non-discretionary accruals for the period 1997 through 2007. 
Research question 3 is a comparative investigation of the proportional differences of 
discretionary accruals before and after the issuance of SOX (periods 2000 and 2005). The average 
percentage of discretionary accruals as a percentage of total accruals for all years 1997 through 
2007 is 67%. The intent of this test is to investigate the proportion of firms who reported 
financials with discretionary accruals representing more than the average discretionary accruals 
as expressed as a percentage of total net accruals for years 1997 through 2007 (67%). The 
findings suggest the proportion of discretionary accruals is greater before the issuance of SOX 
than after the issuance.  
Research question 4 is a comparative investigation of the rate of change in total cash 
earnings with derivative hedging and the rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative 
hedging. The findings suggest the rate of change in total cash earnings with derivative hedging is 
less than the rate of change in total cash earnings without derivative hedging.  
85
Research question 5 is a comparative investigation conducted to investigate the 
proportion of the quality of disclosed financial statements of firms who reported the use of 
derivative hedges. Each firm in the sample is evaluated in terms of risk, hedging, fair value, and 
accounting information provided in annual reports and financial statements. The quality 
disclosure index score (QDI) is calculated by assigning a 1 for reporting the information and a 0 
if otherwise. Then all scores are summed and divided by the possible score. The findings suggest 
the proportion of firms with QDI scores of 80% or above for firms who used derivative hedging 
were greater in 1998 than they were in 2002 (greater before the issuance of SFAS No. 133 than 
after).  
In the next chapter, the interpretation of findings, inferences from study results are 
provided, the impacts to positive social change are explained, and recommendations for further 
research are introduced.  
CHAPTER 5: 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Earnings management activities through the use of discretionary accruals and derivative 
hedging are a central concern because of the financial impact on society as a whole and the 
widening financial exposure of mispricing assets (Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002). The U.S. 
Congress and the Financial Accounting Standards Board has introduced regulation with the 
efforts to minimize ambiguity in derivative hedging and to enhance transparency in financial 
reporting. The Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities (SFAS No. 133) was created in 2001 in response to 
significant hedging losses involving derivatives (Dubofsky, & Miller, 2003). The intent of SFAS 
No. 133 was to control and manage corporate hedging as risk management not earnings 
management activities (Barton, 2001). However, based on the events that have lead to the 
convergence of financial markets in 2007, it is evident that earnings management activities have 
found a place in derivative hedging (Minton, Stulz, & Williamson, 2009). The Sarbanes- Oxley 
Act issued in 2002, was created to strengthen corporate accounting controls. Yet, earnings 
smoothing through the use of discretionary accruals is increasing in the high technology industry 
sector—a sector regarded as income conservative (Uday, Wasley & Waymire, 2004). 
Problems Encountered 
Only U. S. firms identified as high technology firms by SIC code and possess reported 
financial data for years 1998 through 2007 were included in this study. To satisfy this 
requirement, two firms were dropped from the sample (firms with ticker codes MXIM and JDSU) 
and two firms were randomly drawn from the population defined by SIC code (firms with ticker 
codes LSCC and CTXS) to yield 30 companies. This analysis is based on the published financial 
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statements and annual reports of firms in the sample therefore the accuracy of this study is limited 
to financial information reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission during years 1997 
through 2007.  
The economic crisis of 2007-08 that contributed to the meltdown of the of the U.S. sub-
prime housing market had a variety of implications for the economy. The crisis stifled 
international business, spiked global oil and food prices, and brought consumer credit to a halt. It 
also created a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the reporting and regulation of financial 
markets. In this section, the quantitative findings from the tests conducted in this study are 
explained. Each individual research question is answered and a final interpretation of research 
findings is provided. The overall contribution to positive social change is presented and 
recommendations to existing policy will be presented. The final section lays the groundwork for 
future research and includes recommendations for future areas of research.  
Interpretation of Findings 
Research question 1 focused on the differences between total cash earnings and total net 
accruals for high technology firms. The question was addressed with an aggregate t test that is 
used to evaluate the difference in means of total cash earnings and total net accruals for all years 
1997 through 2007. The intent of this test is to identify differences between these two 
populations. The null hypothesis that total cash earnings are equal to total net accruals is rejected 
for all years 1997 – 2007 and is statistically significant. The sensitivity t test that evaluates total 
cash earnings and total net accruals is also statistically significant with a p < .000. The means of 
total cash earnings are greater than the means for total net accruals for all years 1997 through 
2007. The findings from the aggregate t test of all years ranging from 1997 to 2007 suggest firms 
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are using estimates that are significantly lower than actual cash earnings. The findings are 
consistent with the study conducted by Uday, Wasley, and Waymire in 2004.  
The firms in the sample represent the high technology industry segment. The high 
technology industry segment has been described as an income conservative practicing 
environment (Lobo, & Zhou, 2006). High technology firms face greater risks of shareholder 
litigation than other industries (Lobo, Zhou, 2006). High tech industry companies are also 
affected to a greater degree by conservative accounting standards on research and development 
costs (Uday, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004). The means of total cash earnings are greater than the 
means of total accruals for this industry segment; this finding suggests that risk adverse managers 
are likely to be more conservative in their financial reporting. 
Research question 2 focused on the discretionary accruals calculated by referencing the 
modified Jones model to breakout discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals. The 
estimated regression equations are used to determine the discretionary component of total net 
accruals. An evaluation of discretionary accruals activity is conducted. 
Research question 3 focused on the proportional differences between discretionary 
accruals in 2000 and 2005. The number firms with discretionary accruals representing more than 
67% of total net accruals in 2000 is greater than the number of firms with discretionary accruals 
representing more than 67% of total net accruals in 2005 (after SOX) (p = .007). In 2000, 
discretionary accruals represented 75% of total net accruals and in 2005; discretionary accruals 
represented 66% of total net accruals (just 1% less than the average for all years 1997 through 
2007). Although the use of discretionary accruals appears to be shrinking in the high technology 
industry segment, the discretionary percentage remains high.  
Research question 4 focused on the variances in the rate of change in total cash earnings 
with derivative hedging and the variances in the rate of change in total cash earnings without 
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derivative hedging. The findings suggest the rate of change in total cash earnings of firms who 
use derivative hedging (M = 232.54, SD = 1,109) is less volatile than the rate of change in total 
cash earnings of firms who do not use derivative hedging (M = 3,701.91, SD = 8,017). Derivative 
hedging therefore minimizes earnings volatility for firms in the high technology industry 
segment.  
Research question 5 focused on the quality of disclosed financial statements particularly 
with regard to derivative hedging. Firms who reported the use of derivative hedging were 
evaluated with the use of a quality disclosed index (QDI) to reflect the transparency of financial 
reporting in the area of risk, accounting, hedging, and fair value. In the quality disclosure 
analysis, 67% of the firms who reported the use of derivative hedging scored less than .80 on the 
QDI in 1998. In 2002, 48% of firms who reported the use of derivative hedging scored less than 
.80 on the QDI. These findings suggest a 20% increase in the quality of financial transparency 
reporting between year 1998 and 2002. However, 55% of firms who reported the use of 
derivative hedging in 2007 scored less than .80 on the QDI. A population proportion test was 
conducted to test the proportion of quality disclosure reporting between 1998 and 2002. The 
descriptive statistics suggest disclosure quality of high technology firms is increasing. However, 
the null hypothesis that the number of firms in 1998 with QDI scores above 80% is greater than 
the proportion of the firms with QDI scores above 80% in 2002 cannot be rejected (p = .06). This 
suggests the quality of disclosure in derivative reporting in 1998 is superior to the quality of 
disclosure in derivative reporting in 2002. These findings suggest the QDI scores of firms were 
higher before SFAS No. 133 than after the issuance of SFAS No. 133.  
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The QDI scores dropped from .70 in 1997 to .65, in 1998. The largest drop in quality disclosure 
scores of firms who reported the use of derivative hedging between 1997 and 1998 is in the risk 
information (9.5% decrease) and net fair value information (6.8% decrease) categories. These 
findings are consistent with FASB’s response to the significant hedging losses involving 
derivatives and the issuance of SFAS No.133. The intent of SFAS No. 133 was to control and 
manage corporate hedging as risk management (Barton, 2001).  
Conclusions and Implications for Social Change  
The accounting treatment of operational activities has a definite impact on reported 
earnings. It has been argued firms in the high technology industry segment exercise income 
conservatism (Kwon, Yin, & Han, 2006). Total accrual usage has increased and the discretionary 
component of accruals has slightly decreased. The proportion of discretionary accruals in 2000 is 
greater than the proportion of discretionary accruals in 2005, but the proportion of discretionary 
accruals in 2005 is just 1% less than the average discretionary proportion for all years 1997 
through 2007. This suggests that management choices (discretionary accruals) represent a 
significant portion of financial reporting. It is evident SOX implemented in 2002 has minimized 
earnings smoothing through the use of discretionary accruals in the high technology industry 
segment. 
In addition, the use of derivative hedging is increasing; over 70% of the firms in the 
sample reported the use of derivative hedging during the period 1997 through 2007. Derivative 
hedging allows firms to establish a leveraged position with minimal margin requirements 
(sometimes no collateral required) resulting in an increase in price exposure (Financial 
Economists Roundtable. 1994). They are off-balance sheet activities that are not reported with the 
same clarity and detail as other securities, loans, or other assets or liabilities (Guay, 1999).  
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The quality disclosure of financial reporting was investigated to examine the 
transparency of financial reporting for derivative hedging. The findings suggest the quality of 
financial reporting is increasing. The QDI scores of firms were higher before SFAS No. 133 than 
they were after the issuance of SFAS No. 133. However, 55% of firms who reported the use of 
derivative hedging in 2007 scored less than .80 (out of 1.0) on the QDI. For the aggregate years 
1997 through 2007, 51% of firms scored less than .80 on the QDI: hedges of anticipated 
transactions category. In addition, 58% of firms scored less than .80 on the QDI: net fair value 
category for the aggregate years 1997 through 2007. These findings suggest that 51% of firms in 
the high technology industry segment who used derivative hedging during the period 1997 
through 2007, did not fully report activities that exposed the firm to market and credit risk.  
Derivative hedging does have an impact on a firm’s ability to report stable earnings in the 
high tech industry segment. When a firm uses derivative hedging, the variance in the annual rate 
of change in total cash earnings is reduced suggesting derivative hedging minimizes real earnings 
volatility (Barton, 2001). These findings support Barton’s conclusion that derivative hedging 
provides significant value in risk management.  
It is clear that earning smoothing activities represent a large portion of reported earnings 
in the high technology industry segment. Mixed results follow regulations such as SOX and 
FASB 133 with regard to the use of discretionary accruals and derivative hedging. The increase in 
earnings management defined by discretionary accruals is alarming considering the lack of 
transparency in financial reporting.   
Challenges to Neo-Classical Economic Theory  
Under the Efficient Market Theory, a perfectly competitive market is a well-functioning 
market, where the prices of capital assets (securities) reflect predictions based on all relevant and 
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available information (Anderson, Caldwell, & Needles, 1994). This concept holds that securities 
prices established in financial markets, fully reflect all the available and relevant information to 
investors. The assumption is that security prices follow a random walk (Basu, 1977). The premise 
is that if all relevant information is reflected in the current market price, then only meaningless 
noise is left to explain price movements. However, these rules can not apply to a financial 
instrument that presents no market reference for pricing or lies outside the reporting requirements 
of other securities. 
Another axiom of efficient market theory is that investors cannot systematically beat the 
performance of the market because all relevant market information is used to determine the price 
and any future changes in price are sporadic (Laffont, & Maskin, 1990). Any price that does 
reflect the perfectly informed fundamentals creates the possibility of arbitrage trading that will 
drive the price back to the level thus reflecting informed fundamentals  resembling a price 
correction (Brenner, 1979). However, from the findings of this study and from the examples 
illustrated in the collapse of Enron in 2001, and the onslaught of government financial bail outs of 
2009; it is evident that financial markets are imperfect as a result of  information asymmetry. It is 
apparent that a significant level of disparity exists between actual characteristics of financial 
markets and the assumptions of neo-classical economic theory.  
Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM created by William Sharpe and John 
Lintner), market behavior can be explained by pricing risk in financial markets (Jagannathan, & 
Wang, 1996). The premise of the CAPM is that securities are efficiently priced by financial 
markets according to their relative risk (beta) compared to the inherent risk in the market as a 
whole. Under this model, risk is determined by the degree of volatility (Sharpe, 1964). The 
greater the degree of variation measured by beta, the lower the price of the security. This premise 
suggests the market rewards lower risk securities with a higher price and higher risk securities 
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with a greater return on investment (Harris, & F., 2001). However, this efficient-risk-reward 
relationship applies only to the direct ownership of the security. When a firm uses derivatives for 
hedging (or speculating) they are diverting the risk to others. This risk shifting stimulates risk 
exposure to outside counterparties (Jagannathan, & Wang, 1996). For example, Enron’s collapse 
drove natural gas prices down across the U.S. after its counterparties lost their positions which 
required them to replace their short-hedge position on the NYMEX or selling its inventory 
(Benston, & Hartgraves, 2002). It is apparent that hedging risk can result in a rippling effect to 
individuals with no direct exposure to the defaulting party. Therefore, current markets conditions 
cannot address all the aspects of risk hedging. Due to these market imperfections formulated by 
the lack of transparency in derivative reporting and the intent of risk diverting; the establishment 
of market equilibrium and the creation of efficient markets cannot be achieved (Niranjan, Quan, 
& Meenakshi, 2007). These market imperfections, short-comings and other failures result in 
externalities that all individuals in the economy must bear. 
Contributions to Positive Social Change 
This study provides evidence to managers, investors, and legislators that earning 
management activities represent a significant portion of total accruals. It has been shown that the 
accounting treatment of operational activities has an impact on the ability to stabilize reported 
earnings. The evidence also indicates regulation such as SOX and SFAS No. 133 has not 
eliminated earning management activities through the use of discretionary accruals or derivative 
hedging in the high technology industry segment.  
This analysis contributes to positive social change by highlighting the significance of 
these findings and by introducing externalities that have surfaced as a result of the lack of 
transparency in financial reporting. It is essential that government regulation play a leading role 
in setting reporting standards. Free and competitive markets cannot exist with these types of 
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financial instruments. The rippling effects of these instruments extend beyond neo-classical 
economics of market discipline. In some cases, market competition actually drives participants to 
hold less and less capital relative to their risk exposure (Abdel-khalik, 2006). The linkages of 
these externalities are clearly demonstrated by the collapse of the Enron Corporation in 2001 
when the effects of the bankruptcy spread beyond stock and bond holders, employees and 
immediate creditors (Benston, & Hartgraves, 2002). To enhance financial markets and contribute 
to positive social change, I make the following suggestions for regulation modification:  
1. Require disclosure of all derivative activities on balance sheet reports and 
mandate the reporting of prices and other critical market information. Improve 
market transparency by increasing the quantity and quality of available 
information to investors. 
2. Supervise and examine financial institutions and report on their condition. 
3. Collect and help disseminate data. Government regulators should collect accurate 
and unbiased information (enforceable by law) with a consistent methodology to 
provide price data over a long periods of time, and should distribute the 
information in a timely, fair and affordable manner. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
In the fall of 2008, a severe market correction occurred in the financial sector that 
stemmed in large part to the real estate market. As Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Bank of 
America acquired Merrill Lynch and companies ranging from Washington Mutual to AIG were 
tendering on the edge of bankruptcy (Hong, Keejae & Kyonghee, 2009). In response to this 
financial crisis, Congress passed the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008. This Act provided the 
authority for the Federal Government to purchase and ensure certain types of troubled assets for 
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the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial 
system as well as protecting taxpayers.  
Most companies in the economy will experience a rippling effect of the market 
adjustment (Minton, Stulz, & Williamson, 2009). It is conceivable that the high tech sector may 
be partially sheltered from the brunt of the financial crisis as firms try to spend more on 
technology in order to reduce the operational costs. More in depth research in the area of earnings 
smoothing prior to and after the financial crisis of 2008 is needed. Areas for future research 
include derivative hedging in the financial markets, earnings smoothing and management 
discretion in the financial sector, and financial impacts of the Emergency Stabilization Act of 
2008. 
Summary  
It is time to reconsider the assumptions of the feasibility of a truly capital driven financial 
market. The assumptions embedded in the academic areas of finance must be re-evaluated to 
include human behavioral traits. From this study, it is evident the assumptions that participants 
act rationally and that the market is efficient is no longer valid. Under the Efficient Market 
Theory, a perfectly competitive market is a well-functioning market, where the prices of capital 
assets (securities) reflect predictions based on all relevant and available information (Anderson, 
Caldwell, & Needles, 1994); however, if all relevant information is not available (and in most 
cases it is not available) the assumptions of the Efficient Market Theory no longer hold. In 
addition, the rules of efficient markets can not apply to financial instruments that present no 
market reference for pricing or for financial instruments that are unreported and thus reside 
outside the reporting requirements of other securities. 
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Assumptions that are inherent in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) must also be 
re-examined as a result of the findings of this study. The premise of the CAPM is that securities 
are efficiently priced by financial markets according to their relative risk (beta) compared to the 
risk of the market as a whole. Under this model, risk is determined by the degree of volatility 
(Sharpe, 1964). The greater the degree of variation measured by beta, the lower the price of the 
security. This premise suggests the market rewards lower risk securities with a higher price and 
higher risk securities with a greater return on investment (Harris, & F., 2001). However, this 
efficient-risk-reward relationship applies only to the direct ownership of the security and excludes 
the utilization of derivative hedges. When a firm uses derivatives for hedging (or speculating), 
they are diverting the risk to others. This risk shifting stimulates risk exposure to outside 
counterparties (Jagannathan, & Wang, 1996). It is apparent that hedging risk can result in a 
rippling effect to individuals with no direct exposure to the defaulting party. The current markets 
conditions cannot address all the aspects of risk hedging. Due to these market imperfections 
formulated by the lack of transparency in derivative reporting and the intent of risk diverting, the 
establishment of market equilibrium and the creation of efficient markets cannot be achieved. 
These market imperfections, short-comings, and other failures result in externalities that all 
individuals in the economy will bear. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: high technology firms defined by industry SIC code 
Table 6 High Technology Industry Defined by Sic Code
Industry Description SIC Code
Communications Equipment 3660 
Communications Equipment, nec 3669 
Semiconductor and related 3674 
Computer and data processing services 7370 
Computer programming services 7371 
Prepackaged software 7372 
Computer integrated systems design 7373 
Data processing and preparation 7374 
Informational retrieval services 7375 
Computer facilities management 7376 
Computer rental and leasing 7377 
Computer maintance and repair 7378 
Computer related services 7379 
Source: SIC code lookup table available by selecting the Prim. SIC option.  
Note. The firms randomly drawn for this study must be defined by these SIC codes. 
APPENDIX B: type I and type II sampling errors 














(Cohen, J. 1977) 
1997 0.05 0.04 
below 
threshold 0.89 Large effect 
1998 0.05 0.06 
below 
threshold 0.83 Large effect 
1999 0.05 0.09 
below 
threshold 0.78 Large effect 
2000 0.05 0.01 
below 
threshold 1.08 Large effect 
2001 0.05 0.16 below 0.69 Medium effect 
108
threshold 
2002 0.05 0.20 
below 
threshold 0.65 Medium effect 
2003 0.05 0.13 
below 
threshold 0.73 Medium effect 
2004 0.05 0.17 
below 
threshold 0.68 Medium effect 
2005 0.05 0.03 
below 
threshold 0.94 Large effect 
2006 0.05 0.11 
below 
threshold 0.75 Medium effect 
2007 0.05 0.07 
below 
threshold 0.82 Large effect 
1997 - 2007 0.05 0.00 
below 
threshold 0.64 Medium effect 
Thresholds for Cohen's d (Cohen, 1992) 
Effect d  and ß Thresholds   
Small  0.2 : 0.05   
Medium  0.5 ß: 0.02 
Large  0.8 
*all t tests conducted were one tailed t tests (where µ1< µ2)   
Figure 1. Figure showing possible type I and type II errors. Data retrieved from Mergent Online 
database, http://0 www.mergentonline.com.catalog.multcolib.org/compsearch.asp.  















1997 0.05 0.82 0.00  4.56 Large effect 1.00 
1998 0.05 0.69 0.00  2.23 Large effect 1.00 
1999 0.05 0.88 0.00  7.33 Large effect 1.00 
2000 0.05 0.83 0.00  4.88 Large effect 1.00 
2001 0.05 0.72 0.00  2.57 Large effect 1.00 
2002 0.05 0.85 0.00  5.67 Large effect 1.00 
2003 0.05 0.86 0.00  6.14 Large effect 1.00 
2004 0.05 0.91 0.00  10.11 Large effect 1.00 
2005 0.05 0.85 0.00  5.67 Large effect 1.00 
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2006 0.05 0.80 0.00  4.00 Large effect 1.00 
2007 0.05 0.68 0.00  2.13 Large effect 1.00 
Figure 2. Type I and type II errors for linear regression models. Data retrieved from Mergent 
Online database, http://0 www.mergentonline.com.catalog.multcolib.org/compsearch.asp 
Appendix C: Aggregate Total Cash Earnings and Total Net Accruals t test 






Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat 3.025  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.002  
t Critical one-tail 1.691  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.005  
t Critical two-tail 2.032   
1998 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   
TCE TNA   
Mean 819.56 -283.98   
Variance 3650134.26 540657.05   
Observations 30 30   
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0    
df 37    
t Stat 2.953    
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003    
t Critical one-tail 1.687    
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.005    
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t Critical two-tail 2.026     
1999 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 





Hypothesized Mean Difference 0   
df 41   
t Stat 2.840   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003   
t Critical one-tail 1.683   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.007   
t Critical two-tail 2.020    
2000 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
      
  TCE TNA    
Mean 1932.77 -575.16    
Variance 1.2E+07 1245107    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 35     
t Stat 3.718     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000     
t Critical one-tail 1.690     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001     
t Critical two-tail 2.030      
2001 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
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TCE TNA    
Mean 1984.59 -1771.8    
Variance 3.7E+07 2.3E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 55     
t Stat 2.669     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.005     
t Critical one-tail 1.673     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.010     
t Critical two-tail 2.004      
2002 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
      
TCE TNA     
Mean 2399.71 -2021.7     
Variance 5.7E+07 3.7E+07     
Observations 30 30     
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0      
df 56      
t Stat 2.498      
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.008      
t Critical one-tail 1.673      
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.015      
t Critical two-tail 2.003       
2003 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
TCE TNA    
Mean 2895.58 -2122.5    
Variance 8.7E+07 5.6E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 55     
t Stat 2.297     
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P(T<=t) one-tail 0.013     
t Critical one-tail 1.673     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.025     
t Critical two-tail 2.004      
2004 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
      
  TCE TNA    
Mean 3888.70
-
2832.73    
Variance 1.1E+08 8E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 56     
t Stat 2.660     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.005     
t Critical one-tail 1.673     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.010     
t Critical two-tail 2.003      
2005 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
      
  TCE TNA    
Mean 2840.41
-
1504.49    
Variance 3.2E+07 1E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 46     
t Stat 3.651     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000     
t Critical one-tail 1.679     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001     
t Critical two-tail 2.013      
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2006 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
TCE TNA    
Mean 3442.50
-
2120.15    
Variance 7.5E+07 3.9E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 53     
t Stat 2.852     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003     
t Critical one-tail 1.674     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006     
t Critical two-tail 2.006      
2007 t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
     
TCE TNA    
Mean 3380.79
-
2133.76    
Variance 6.5E+07 2.9E+07    
Observations 30 30    
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0     
df 51     
t Stat 3.109     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.002     
t Critical one-tail 1.675     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003     
t Critical two-tail 2.008      
  
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Years 1997 - 2007 






Difference 0  
df 612  
t Stat 8.204  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000  
t Critical one-tail 1.647  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000  
t Critical two-tail 1.964   
APPENDIX D: Statistical Data Tables for Estimated Regression Equations 
1997 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.906784685  
R Square 0.822258465  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.801749826  
Standard Error 219.7655248  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 5809140.793 1936380.264 
40.09327
4 6.75646E-10 
Residual 26 1255719.033 48296.88588  
Total 29 7064859.826  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 




ATA 0.146520567 0.018999269 7.711905321 
3.494E-
08 0.10746701 














 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%   
Intercept 115.8485285 -89.51155904 115.8485285  
ATA 0.185574124 0.10746701 0.185574124  






1998 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.836055057  
R Square 0.698988058  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.66425591  
Standard Error 368.2747514  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 8188479.527 2729493.2 
20.1251035
1 5.91566E-07 
Residual 26 3526283.605 135626.29   
Total 29 11714763.13  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 92.19335028 82.36271296 1.1193579 
0.27322227
5 -77.1056292 
ATA 0.122349795 0.024296051 5.0357893 
3.05776E-
05 0.072408547 













 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 261.4923298 -77.1056292 261.49233  
ATA 0.172291043 0.072408547 0.172291  
Sales – Rec 0.378640953 -0.130622092 0.378641  
GPPE 
-
0.027408265 -0.176432309 -0.0274083  
1999 Statistical Summary 
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.940242584  
R Square 0.884056116  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.870677976  
Standard Error 371.6492938  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 27382428.44 9127476.148 66.0821376 2.70474E-12 
Residual 26 3591203.137 138123.1976  
Total 29 30973631.58  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 



















GPPE 0.160601381 0.031702416 5.06590348 
2.82434E-
05 0.095436132 
 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 301.8390863 -30.93423679 301.8390863  
ATA 0.094528848 -0.005142328 0.094528848  
Sales – Rec 0.19369048 -0.325583786 0.19369048  
GPPE 0.22576663 0.095436132 0.22576663  
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df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 158161476.5 52720492.18 
41.1903
6 5.070377E-10 
Residual 26 33278000.16 1279923.083  
Total 29 191439476.7  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept -90.8511 249.9046 -0.3635 0.7191 -604.5373 
ATA 0.1889 0.0284 6.6562 0.0000 0.1305 
Sales – Rec 0.1010 0.1480 0.6827 0.5008 -0.2031 
GPPE 0.0118 0.0605 0.1952 0.8468 -0.1126 
 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 422.8351 -604.5373 422.8351 
ATA 0.2472 0.1305 0.2472 
Sales – Rec 0.4052 -0.2031 0.4052 
GPPE 0.1362 -0.1126 0.1362 




Multiple R 0.856447174  
R Square 0.733501761  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.702751965  
Standard Error 2569.410076  
Observations 30 
ANOVA    
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 472440381.5 157480127 
23.8538734
6 1.24138E-07 
Residual 26 171648571.6 6601868.1  
Total 29 644088953.1  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 
-





ATA 0.358093657 0.052489498 6.8221963 
3.05713E-
07 0.250199951 
Sales – Rec 
-










 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 419.6933695 -1942.729557 419.69337  
ATA 0.465987364 0.250199951 0.4659874  
Sales – Rec 0.70569081 -0.965069081 0.7056908  
GPPE 0.040476734 -0.515625253 0.0404767  
2002 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.925317838  
R Square 0.856213102  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.839622306  




df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 





Residual 26 150973681.9 
5806680.07
5
Total 29 1049982191  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 
-
530.7565169 525.7523857 -1.00951804 
0.32202952
7 -1611.45601 
ATA 0.471822744 0.039219732 
12.0302388
2 3.9641E-12 0.391205431 





0.483420504 0.083470406 -5.79151973 4.2222E-06 -0.65499638 
 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 549.9429787 -1611.456012 
549.942978
7
ATA 0.552440057 0.391205431 
0.55244005
7





0.311844629 -0.65499638 -0.31184463  
2003 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.9276225  
R Square 0.8604835  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.8443854  
Standard Error 2941.2167  
Observations 30 
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 




Residual 26 224919648 8650755.705  




Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 





ATA 0.3432068 0.0557855 6.152262274 
1.66437E-
06 0.228538169 
Sales – Rec 4.1760537 0.9999854 4.176114678 
0.00029495
6 2.120554315 






95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 417.04578 -2180.5632 417.0457808  
ATA 0.4578755 0.2285382 0.45787552  
Sales – Rec 6.2315532 2.1205543 6.231553162  
GPPE -0.4185506 -0.8178858 
-
0.418550622  
2004 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.955281106  
R Square 0.912561992     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.902472991  
Standard Error 2772.562658  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 2085922698 695307566.1 
90.4511755
9 7.00415E-14 
Residual 26 199864696.1 7687103.695  
Total 29 2285787394  
 Coefficients 
Standard 











ATA 0.584184789 0.046574439 12.54303423 
1.56188E-
12 0.488449658 
















 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 284.3269581 -2327.366592 284.3269581  
ATA 0.679919919 0.488449658 0.679919919  






2005 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.913243949  
R Square 0.83401451  
Adjusted R 
Square 0.814862338  
Standard Error 1321.027929  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 227982141.5 75994047.16 
43.5467326
2 2.79381E-10 
Residual 26 45372984.55 1745114.79  
Total 29 273355126  
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 77.50218887 288.726343 0.268427841 
0.79048837
5 -515.983303 
ATA 0.19621025 0.019843618 9.887826233 
2.68003E-
10 0.155421109 









GPPE - 0.047659317 - 0.02525916 -
122
0.113149304 2.374127675 1 0.211114433 
 Upper 95% Lower 95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 670.9876808 -515.983303 670.9876808   
ATA 0.236999392 0.155421109 0.236999392  






2006 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY 
















df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 3 888456387 296152129 
34.667981
04 3.09198E-09 
Residual 26 222105675.7 
8542525.98
7
Total 29 1110562063  
Coefficients 
Standard 




























































Sales – Rec 1.76635379 
-








2007 Statistical Summary 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.825  
R Square 0.681     
Adjusted R Square 0.644  
Standard Error 3,167.285  
Observations 30 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 





Residual 26 260824103 
10031696.2
5   




Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 





















































APPENDIX E: derivative hedging: F test two sample variance 
F-test Two-Sample for Variances 
   
  TCE without derivatives TCE with derivatives 
Mean 232.54 3701.91 





F Critical one-tail 0.3146
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Margot Geagon 
327 NW Gina Way, Apt 230, Aloha, OR 97006 
Email: margot_g@comcast.net  
Phone: (503) 467-6135  
PROFILE 
This is a profile of a high caliber finance and economic professional with strong a strong 
background in financial analysis, econometrics, and statistics.  
EDUCATION 
Ph.D. Walden University, Applied Management Decision Sciences 
Major: Finance 
Support Area: Strategic Finance 
Dissertation Title: Earnings Management with Derivatives and the use of Accounting Accruals 
Dissertation Chairman: Dr. Thomas Spencer 
M.B.A. Marylhurst University Graduate School, June 2003. 
Thesis Title: An Analytical Approach to Valuing Human Capital Investments with Real Options  
Concentration: Finance 
M.P.A. Portland State University Hatfield School of Government, August 2002. 
Thesis Title: Performance Measurement in the Public Sector: Evaluating the Subjective Benefits 
of Public Service  
Concentration: Program Evaluation 
M.F.M. Portland State University Hatfield School of Government (Masters Endorsement), 
August 2002. 
Thesis Title: Disincentives to Efficiency: Public Sector Budgeting Structure  
Concentration: Public Sector Financial Management 
B.A. Western New Mexico University, School of Management, May 1982.  
Received dual degrees in magazines and marketing management 
Concentration: Business Administration: Finance 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Adjunct Professor of Economics, Warner Pacific University, School of Business, Summer and 
Fall Sessions 2005.  
Adjunct Professor of Finance, Warner Pacific University, School of Business, Summer and Fall 
Sessions 2005.  
Undergraduate Teaching: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics & Corporate Finance,  
Primary teaching areas: Introduction to Business, Introduction to Management course. Average 
class size of 40. 
HIGHLIGHTS OF WORK EXPERIENCE 
Business Strategist, Silver City Trading Company, 1994-1999 
Managed operational staff and reduced operational costs by 32% by creating operational policies. 
Created financial statements and capital budgeting modules for financial reporting and planning. 
Created mission based budgeting standards 
126
Cost Accounting Manager, Compact Controls, 1999-2004  
Supervised the Accounting Department and implemented cost rollups for manufactured and 
purchased materials. Prepared trial balances for months end and closed the books for all accounts. 
Problem solved variances between the general ledger and subsidiary ledgers. 
Reduced process times by 17% by performing time studies and establishing manufacturing 
standards. 
Financial Consultant, Nike, 2001-2002  
Formulated Descriptive Statistical Standards for Cost Accounting Created an Economic Order 
Quantity Standard for Purchasing: Team Sports Reduced the cost of inventory moves through all 
associated inventory accounts by 27%. 
Financial Consultant, Oregon Health Sciences University: Cancer Institute, 2002-2003  
Provided financial consulting for the Bioinformatics Core Assisted in the formulation of the 
2003-2008 Master NIH Grant Created Funds Flows Statements for Clinical Trials  
Cost Accountant III, Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon, 2005-2008.  
Created Medical, Dental, and Drug statistics for Claims, Contracts, Members, and Groups for all 
Regence Plans and TRG [The Regence Group] Analyzed and managed Plan and TRG 
Operational Accounts. Performed Analysis and Problem Solved Accounting Discrepancies in 
Operational Activities for 5 divisions [Actuarial, Underwriting, Finance, Human Resources, and 
Membership Services]  
MEMBERSHIPS & AFFILIATIONS 
Professional: 
Member of the Emerging Markets Advisory Board for Regence BCBS 
Member of the American Finance Association 
Member of the American Statistical Association: Oregon Charter  
RESEARCH 
Hedging in International Markets, 2004
Abstract: 
In this explorative study, an investigation of theoretical options models used in international 
finance is evaluated to acquire knowledge that explains why global firms support decisions to 
employ financial hedges. The findings of this study suggest International investing through the 
utilization of derivative contracts may minimize the firm’s exposure to systematic risk. An 
illustration of markets conversion is presented in this study to provide an explanation of the 
inherent volatility of international markets and the increased level of systematic risk.  
Application Errors of Financial Derivatives, 2005
Abstract: 
The premise of this study is grounded on an in-depth evaluation of finance strategies from the 
context of current international financial risk management. The scope includes the analysis of 
financial derivatives that are valued on the performance of other underlying investment 
127
instruments. The range of this analysis includes derivatives such as (a) options; (b) futures; (c) 
swaps, and (d) commodity futures. In this evaluation, each derivative design has been analyzed in 
terms of inherent strengths and weaknesses when applied to real life situations of uncertainty.  
Capital Budgeting Theory in Practice, 2006
Abstract: 
An investigation of theoretical finance models used in capital budgeting is presented in this 
research study. This analysis is completed to elucidate the rationale of the twenty-first century 
financial manager attempting to make vital corporate decisions based on educated guesses and 
corporate rules of thumb. Capital budgeting decisions involve the largest tangible investments of 
any firm and require a more robust framework of analysis. The evaluation approach of this study 
is established by critically analyzing capital budgeting theories, and through the assessment of 
existing theoretical propositions and hypotheses that comprise strategic capital budgeting. 
Implications of Derivative Applications, 2006
Abstract: 
The implications of derivative applications can be devastating and can create risk barriers within 
international markets. This study provides an in-depth evaluation widely accepted financial 
models including (a) Black-Scholes model; (b) the stochastic-interest-rate option model created 
by Merton; (c) Amin and Jarrow’s discrete path-independent model, and (d) the Cox and Ross 
jump and diffusion processes model. The objective of this investigation is to identify the best 
hedging strategy by evaluating each derivative model with the intent to expose the effectiveness 
of each model in terms of pricing errors. 
Capital Budgeting Misconceptions in the Workplace, 2007
Abstract: 
Capital Budgeting is a tremendously vital aspect of a firm's financial structure. Many business 
professional may neglect the importance of this particular area of business due in large part to the 
total proportion of capital assets this area represents. It is true, capital assets usually represent a 
smaller portion of a firm’s total assets however, unlike current assets; capital assets are long-term 
investments that require long-term commitments. When a firm purchases a capital asset, the firm 
exposes itself to risks associated with a long-term investment. If for example, the firm makes a 
mistake in purchasing a capital asset the firm must live with that mistake for a long period of 
time. It is clear capital budgeting is of the utmost importance to any firm. 
The objective of this study is to provide an in-depth knowledge base of the most widely used 
asset pricing models in strategic capital budgeting including the (a) payback method; (b) net 
present value; (c) internal rate of return, and (d) capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In 
exploration, each variable that embodies the theory of the CAPM has been analyzed in terms of 
inherent strengths and weaknesses when applied to real life situations of uncertainty. 
128
Capital Rationing with Real Options and Linear Programming, 2007
Abstract: 
This investigation explores the implications of capital budgeting theory and the implementation 
of widely used budgeting models utilized for capital rationing, mutually exclusive and 
independent investment projects. Particular models include the internal rate of return (IRR); 
modified IRR; net present value; profitability index technique; and capital asset pricing model.  
Real options; linear programming; and optimization models are introduced as models that 
maximize capital asset allocations more effectively in situations of uncertainty. The alternative 
models introduced in this study have been tested in financial applications. Recommendations are 
provided based on the findings of the study that include the elimination of obsolete financial 
models introduced in most business schools.  
Residencies
Winter Session, Dallas, TX  2006  
Spring Session, Los Angeles, CA  2005 
Summer Session, Seattle, WA  2004  
